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Abstract
Decentralised Finance (DeFi) applications compose an entire financial ecosystem
deployed on the Ethereum blockchain. DeFi applications consist of complex and new
protocols whose financial safety is not entirely clear. Besides, their adoption is rapidly
growing, hence imperilling an increasingly higher amount of assets. Therefore, an
accurate formalisation and verification of their behaviour is essential to deepen the
understanding of their safety. A first step in this direction was taken by Bartoletti
et al. (arXiv:2012.13230,2020) defining a formal model for the most widespread DeFi
protocols: Lending Pools (LP).
The primary aim of this thesis was to develop a verification tool of the LP
model. This was achieved by leveraging the Maude verification environment and the
MultiVeStA statistical analyser. Maude is a verification toolset enabling to simulate
and conduct various analyses on a model specified in the Maude specification language.
MultiVeStA is a Java engine enabling statistical analyses via Monte-Carlo discrete-
event simulations, such as the ones generated by a model specified in Maude. Thus, a
simulator of lending pools was developed in the Maude language and it was integrated
with MultiVeStA in order to support several analyses on LP, including reachability
analysis, LTL model checking and statistical analyses. The Maude simulator was
also validated by a complete suite of test cases.
Furthermore, the proposed tool allows to statistically analyse several param-
eters of LP, which are fundamental to enhance its safety. In order to illustrate
this, a statistical analysis was developed by the means of the MultiVeStA engine.
The results of the analysis was that the default parameters, presented by Barto-
letti et al., appear to maximise the platform financial safety. Additionally, the
verification tool is open to the public under GNU-GPLv2.0 and it is available at
https://github.com/MMirelli/maude-lp.
Keywords Formal Methods, Model Checking, Reachability Analysis, Discrete-Event
Model Statistical Analysis, Decentralised Finance Safety, Lending Pools
Simulator, MultiVeStA Statistical Analyses
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1 Introduction
Financial trading has recently shifted to virtual markets, platforms entirely regulated
and controlled by novel protocols. Given the considerable amount of funds daily
exchanged on such platforms [1, 20], even minor design flaws could determine massive
and intolerable losses [32]. Consequently, formal verification of these systems is crucial,
in order to ensure their correctness and safe behaviour. This thesis proposes a novel
tool capable of verifying financial safety properties for a class of the aforementioned
platforms.
This chapter aims at giving a synopsis of the thesis. Firstly, Section 1.1 introduces
the research problem. Secondly, Section 1.2 presents the main contributions of this
thesis. Lastly, Section 1.3 describes the organisation of the thesis into its sections.
1.1 Context
Ethereum is a recent platform deployed on a novel blockchain [15]. The platform
offers a distributed infrastructure to execute applications, i.e. smart contracts [25],
leveraging the blockchains technology in order to eliminate intermediaries. Smart
contracts may implement any type of application, including games [47], e-commerce
[5] and financial applications [12, 35]. The ethereum-based financial environment
is also called Decentralised Finance (DeFi) [54], due to the peer-to-peer nature of
the blockchain ethereum relies upon. However, even assuming the security guar-
antees ensured by the underlying blockchain, DeFi smart contracts have several
vulnerabilities latent in their design [45, 58]. Additionally, decentralised finance has
recently been employed by a growing community of users. As of June 2021, the
growth of the capital locked by DeFi applications has increased by over 370 times
since the previous year: from approximately $172mln, on 6 June 2020, to over $64bn,
on 6 June 2021 [44]. The increasing value of the assets exchanged by this means
motivates the compelling necessity of formally verifying desirable safety properties of
such systems. Notwithstanding the increasing interest of several research groups in
this area [11, 5, 2, 52, 4, 26], the complexity of such platforms and their recentness
constantly arise new interesting research problems. This motivates the development
of a new formal verification tool to analyse DeFi systems.
Traditional formal verification techniques, such as model checking, do not directly
analyse the implementation of the considered system [18]. Contrarily, they operate
on a mathematical representation of the system, the so called formal model. The
verification tool proposed in this thesis simulates and analyses the Lending Pools
(LP) model as defined by Bartoletti et al. [7]. LP formally defines the behaviour
of the most widespread DeFi applications, namely Aave [12] and Compound [35]1,
allowing their users to perform several operations on virtual assets. The two main
features of such platforms are lending and borrowing assets, which could suffice to
increase the users’ profits by various financial practices, including margin trading.
Lending pools formalises highly-distributed systems, where multiple actions could
be performed by each user, at any time. In order to capture this complexity, LP
1At the time of writing, these are the first and third as per the amount of capital locked [44].
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utilises non-determinism. Consequently, the model can be more simply specified
in a language capable of expressing non-deterministic events in a simple manner.
The Maude project offers a specification language [19] suitable for defining highly
concurrent systems. Additionally, Maude provides a very extensive environment for
both simulating and verifying the properties of the specified models. Consequently,
the lending pools model has been specified in the Maude language. From this moment,
the developed Maude specification of lending pools will also be regarded to as the
Maude-based LP simulator.
However, given the complexity of the modelled systems, the analyses techniques
offered by the Maude environment are not sufficient. Specifically, since the system
may evolve by following an infinite number of execution paths, the traditional model
checking methods result in being either ineffective or unviable. Therefore, the Maude-
based LP simulator has been extended to support a more efficient approach, namely
statistical analyses. This has been achieved by integrating the simulator with the
MultiVeStA statistical analyser [53]. Statistical analyses, despite producing less
accurate results, allow to observe the quantitative behaviour of the model, offering
statistically-valid results. In the case of lending pools, this approach allows to
estimate parameters of the model so to increase its safety. Specifically, an essential
safety property of the model is that the number of nonrepayable loans is minimal.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis proposes a Maude-based LP simulator capable of conducting several
analyses of lending pools including:
1. reachability analysis;
2. LTL model checking;
3. statistical analysis.
Additionally, the study showcases the usage of the tool by answering a still
uninvestigated research question, aiming at an enhancement of the analysed platforms’
safety. Precisely, an ad-hoc statistical analysis shows that a choice of the parameters
used to instantiate the LP model reduces the amount of nonrepayable loans.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows.
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Section 2 details the analysed model and gives the necessary prerequisites in
terms of both the Maude environment and the developed analyses.
Section 3 describes the developed Maude-based simulator of lending pools, out-
lining its features and components.
Section 4 showcases a simulation scenario used to conduct the statistical analysis
presented at the end of Section 5.
Section 5 illustrates the functionalities of the model and illustrates the results of
the statistical analysis whose components were defined in Section 4.
Section 6 elaborates on the contributions of this thesis comparing them with
related pieces of research
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2 Background notions
2.1 The formal model: Lending Pools
Lending pools, also known as Loanable Funds Markets [55], is a formal model for
a class of Decentralised Finance (DeFi) protocols [56] allowing their users to lend
and borrow assets on a virtual market. Similarly to other DeFi solutions, LP do not
require a trusted third party (TTP) in order to operate reliably. In DeFi applications,
the guarantees and functionalities offered by a TTP are ensured by distributed ledgers
technologies, more commonly known as blockchains. Specifically, DeFi applications,
including LP, are mainly deployed on the Ethereum blockchain [54].
This section overviews such concepts; specifically, Section 2.1.1 explains dis-
tributed ledgers technologies, with a particular focus on blockchains, Section 2.1.2
outlines the basics of Ethereum, and Section 2.1.3 describes lending pools.
2.1.1 Distributed ledger technologies
In the last decade, distributed ledger technologies (DLT) have significantly evolved
in a scattered manner, frequently being a source of ambiguity in the literature [57, 3].
This work uses the DLT definition delineated in [46]:
A DLT [...] is a system of electronic records that enables independent
entities to establish a consensus around a shared ’ledger’ - without relying
on a central coordinator to provide the authoritative version of the records.
In other words, a DLT can be defined as a fully-distributed database, whose
components are nodes (peers) holding replicas of the ledger. Nonetheless, unlike a
regular distributed database, a DLT allows the nodes to take part in the so called
consensus mechanism, entailing the validity of the next possible state. In case all
the nodes are given the right to join the decision, the DLT is said permissionless; if
only a subset of them is allowed, the ledger is known as permissioned [14].
Although, several distributed ledgers have been theorized, only one type, blockchains,
has been extensively deployed [24]. Since the ledger which Ethereum relies on is a
permissioneless blockchain [15], this section only introduces this ledger type. More
complete, and still formal, presentations of DLT variants are [14, 24].
A blockchain is often visualized as a linked list of blocks, representing the evolution
of the ledger [40]. In the first ever developed blockchain, Bitcoin [39], each block
holds the information of several funds transactions between peers. Thus, the current
system state is given by all the individual transactions stored on each block of the
blockchain. Thus, the integrity the blockchain must maintain is two-fold, in the way
that each peer should be able:
1. to prove the validity of a block;
2. to verify the therein transactions.
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Bitcoin achieves the former property by storing in each block the hash computed
over its content and the hash of its parent block’s content. Transaction verification,
instead, relies on public key cryptography: each transaction is signed by the private
key of the payer, hence it can be verified by any peer in the network, using the payer’s
public key. Since a blockchain is a DLT, each node of the system stores the whole
list of blocks and a consensus algorithm is executed in order to find an agreement on
the next valid block, implying a new system configuration.
With respect to this thesis, we define a blockchain as a state transition system,
as expressed in [15]. Defining a balance as the amount of a virtual asset held by
a blockchain peer, a state of the blockchain transition system is simply the list of
its peers’ balances. Contrarily, the transition function is defined as a function that,
given a state and a set of funds transactions, returns a new valid state (the one with
the balances updated accordingly to the transactions). Section 2.1.3 gives a more
formal definition of the model this thesis refers to.
2.1.2 Ethereum and smart contracts
Ethereum is often referred to as the direct successor of Bitcoin, since it enables its
users to run composable procedures, smart contracts, on a secure blockchain-based
infrastructure [59]. Smart contracts, first developed by Szabo [50], are programs
capable of effectively reproducing the terms of a material contract, having the
potential to replace the roles currently played by third parties (namely banks, or
similar institutions). Although the blockchain peers are enabled by smart contracts
functions to interact with them, peers are not allowed to directly control the contracts,
which instead execute autonomously [25].
Several applications can be developed leveraging smart contracts, including
Decentralised Finance. Gudgeon et al. [26] define Decentralised Finance as a peer-
to-peer financial system which leverages distributed ledger-based smart contracts to
ensure its integrity and security. Besides being an effective deterrent to a number of
attacks, as observed in [14], Ethereum blockchain ensures that a number of properties
are satisfied by DeFi [55].
First, the blockchain consensus mechanism and public key cryptography enables
agents to verify any system state, allowing for non-custodial transactions to happen
securely. This determines that users are no longer required to trust a third-party
custodian, when depositing their funds as collateral.
Second, agents can join the network in a permissionless manner, as they are not
bound to any strong identity [15], entailing that a user might have a number of
accounts open.
Lastly, as DeFi protocols are implemented by composing smart contracts, they
can, in turn, be combined in order to extend their functionalities.
Although the previous properties are certainly desirable, they also introduce risks
which require to be tackled. In lending pools, those resulting from the first two
properties are hindered by a collateralization mechanism, as explained in Section 2.1.3.
Contrarily, the composability of smart contracts can cause serious vulnerabilities,
still representing an open problem [55].
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2.1.3 A class of DeFi applications: lending pools
Lending pools (LP) models a subcategory of DeFi protocols enabling users to borrow
and lend virtual assets. At the time of this writing, the smart contracts modelled by
LP are the most utilised class of DeFi protocols, with the majority of them being
deployed on Ethereum [44]. Their functioning differs from both regular lending
and peer-to-peer one [27]. In fact, these protocols are dissimilar from the former,
due to their decentralised nature, as described in Section 2.1.1. Similarly, they
can neither be considered fully peer-to-peer lending applications, as assets are not
directly borrowed and lent by agents. Instead, deposited funds are pooled and lent
on-demand to borrowers, only if they possess enough collateral (i.e. only if their
account is overcollaterized). As Ethereum does not provide strong identities, but
pseudonyms [15], users’ actions are difficult to be regulated under a jurisdiction,
which makes collateralization the main protection mechanism against adversarial
behaviours [41]. According to this mechanism, an agent can only borrow a quantity
of tokens worth less than the amount of collateral they deposited. This mechanism
and others, including interest rates, is in place in order to incentivize borrowers to
repay their loans.
The remaining part of this section details the lending pools model formalised by
Bartoletti et al. [7]. They give an accurate operational description of the semantics
of LP protocol actions, based on the analysis of two major lending pools protocols:
Compound [35] and Aave [12].
The basic components of their model are agents and cryptoassets. LP agents are
the rational entities taking part in the protocol. Contrarily, LP cryptoassets are token
types, each representing a different virtual currency. Bartoletti et al. distinguish two
classes of token types: free tokens and minted tokens, denoted respectively by the
sets Tf = {τi}i∈[1...k] and Tm = {τ ′i}i∈[1...k], where k is the number of cryptocurrencies
available on the pool. The set of all tokens T is defined as T := Tf ∪ Tm. The
substantial difference between these classes of token types is that free tokens have a
value established by external markets, whereas minted tokens are assets coined by
the protocol, hence holding value only in a specific LP environment. In other words,
minted tokens can be considered as loyalty credits held by the agents actively joining
the protocol. In fact, minted tokens are granted by the protocol to the agents in
return for free tokens, hence each minted token τ ′ corresponds to a free token τ , also
called its underlying token2.
Given agents and assets, the LP model can be represented as a transition system
where each state, or configuration Γ, is of the form Γ := σ | π | p. First, the wallets
function σ is defined as the function (2.1) storing each agent’s balance of free tokens.
For instance, the wallet of a generic agent A is expressed by the partial function σA,
and the balance of its τ -typed tokens by σA(τ).
σ : A → (T → R+0 ) (2.1)
The second configuration component, the pool π, is a triple storing the current
lending state of the LP. It is composed by three partial functions as in (2.2): πf
2The underlying token of τ ′ is also denoted as uπ(τ ′) = τ .
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storing the amount of free tokens deposited on the pool, πl memorising the loans
each agent owes to the pool and πm keeping track of the minted tokens (also called
the collateral or credits) purchased from the pool.
π := ( πf , πl, πm ), where
πf : Tf → R+0 (2.2)
πl : A → (Tf → R+0 )
πm : Tf → (Tm × R+0 )
The third configuration component is the price partial function p, defined in (2.3).
The price function stores the price of each free token, available in the pool.
p : dom(πf )→ R+0 (2.3)
In order to make the notation simpler and more lightweight, some additional
notation should be introduced. Given a partial map f , the notation f{v/x} indicates
a point-wise update of f at point x, as specified in (2.4).
f{v/x} :=
⎧⎨⎩f{v/x}(x) = vf{v/x}(y) = f(y) if y ̸= x (2.4)
Additionally, the partial binary map ◦ is introduced so to add elements to the
domains of the partial functions previously defined. Hence, given a partial map
f : T → R+0 , a token type τ ∈ T and a partial binary operation ◦ : R+0 × R+0 → R+0 ,
the partial map f ◦ v : τ is defined in (2.5).
f ◦ v : τ :=
⎧⎨⎩f{f(τ) ◦ v/τ} if τ ∈ dom(f) and (f(τ) ◦ v) ∈ R
+
0
f{v/τ} if τ /∈ dom(f)
(2.5)
In order to describe the model evolution, some additional definitions shall be
given. The following LP components may rely on the whole configuration, Γ, or
some of its components. This dependency is indicated by the means of subscripts.
For instance, defining the function F as FX implies that the value returned by the
function F is based on the state of the X component of Γ.
Firstly, the concept of loan and minted value held by a specific user is explained.
Intuitively, the value functions return the current value of respectively the minted
tokens owned and the free tokens borrowed by an agent. More precisely, the loan
value V lΓ and the minted value V mΓ functions for a generic agent A are defined in




(πl(A))(τ) · p(τ) (2.6)
3ERπ(τ, τ ′) is the exchange rate of the minted token τ ′ into τ . For brevity, this is not defined,
the interested reader can refer to [7], Section 3.4.
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V mΓ (A) :=
∑︂
τ ′∈Tm
σA(τ ′) · ERπ(τ ′, τ) · p(τ) (2.7)
Secondly, the collateralization function is an essential indicator of agents’ lending
safety. In fact, a collateralization below a given threshold (Cmin) entails an agent to be
liquidated and hence to incur in a financial loss, as detailed later. The collateralization





Having introduced the necessary model components, the model dynamics can
now be outlined. In fact, the services offered by the smart contracts (so called
functions) are also formalized in [7]. These functionalities of smart contracts are
effectively represented by agents’ actions (or rules) having a precise formal semantics.
Accordingly to the notation in [7], a rule named "r" and executed by agent A with n
input parameters zn is indicated by rA(zn)4. Given agents A and B, LP rules are
summarised in Table 2.1.
In lending pools, a committed rule entails the system to change configuration
as per its semantics. A system transition from state Γ to Γ′ via the rA(zn) action
is expressed by the notation: Γ rA(z
n)−−−→ Γ′. Consequently, a specific instantiation
of the LP model could be represented by a transition system (S, I, R,AP, L) as in
Table 2.2.
In order to specify more precisely the semantics of an LP action, the liquidate
action from [7] is shown in Figure 2.1 and its semantics are explained. According to
the standard operational semantics syntax [43], the transaction below the solid line
is executed if the eleven preconditions are satisfied. The essential preconditions to
understand the rule are 4 , 8 , 9 , 10 and 11 .
1 τ ′ ∈ Tm 2 σA(τ̂) ≥ v 3 πl(B)(τ̂) ≥ v
4 v′ := v · p(τ̂)
p(uπ(τ ′)) · rliq 5 σB(τ
′) ≥ v′ 6 π′f := πf + v : τ̂
7 π′l := πl B − v : τ̂ 8 σ′A := σA − v : τ̂ + v′ : τ ′ 9 σ′B := σB − v′ : τ ′
10 Cσ|π|p(B) < Cmin 11 Cσ′|π′|p(B) ≤ Cmin
σ | π | p LiqA(B,v:τ̂ ,τ
′)−−−−−−−−→ σ{σ′A/A}{σ′B/B} | (π′f , π′l, πm) | p
Figure 2.1: The liquidate rule in [7].
4 - computes the reward for the liquidating agent. This is based on the liquidated
amount v and the reward factor rliq. Here the idea is that A, by repaying part of
B’s loan, is reducing the likelihood of the protocol to become illiquid. As a result,
this behaviour is incentivized by the platform by setting the aforementioned
4This can be also defined as an action of a given arity n.
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TrfA(B, v : τ) A transfers v free-tokens of type τ from its wallet to B’s one.
MtrfA(B, v : τ ′) A transfers v units of minted token τ ′ to B, as long as A remains
overcollateralized.
DepA(v : τ) A deposits v free-tokens of type τ from its wallet to the pool.
Subsequently, the pool coins v′ units of τ ′, with v′ computed so
to incentivize deposits only if the LP is lacking free tokens.
RdmA(v : τ ′) A redeems v units of the minted token τ ′, as long as A’s col-
lateralization is greater than a threshold (Cmin) and LP holds
enough tokens of type τ ′.
BorA(v : τ) A borrows v units of a free token τ , assuming it has enough
collateral.
RepA(v : τ) A repays v units of its loan in the free token τ to the LP.
LiqA(B, v : τ̂ , τ ′) A (liquidator) liquidates a variable amount of B’s (borrower’s)
minted tokens τ ′, by paying v units of free tokens τ̂ . Notably,
τ̂ ∈ Tf is in general different than τ , the underlying token of τ ′ ∈
Tm. This action can be executed only if the B’s collateralization
is below Cmin, meaning B is undercollaterized.
Int The LP underlying smart contract sets a new interest rate
for specific token types. This is a means for the system to
disincentivize borrowers from postponing their loans repayment.
Table 2.1: Summary of lending pools actions from [7]
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S a countably infinite set of states (or configurations) of the form
Γ := (σ | π | p), as previously defined.
I a set of initial states, each Γi := (σi | πi | pi) comprising the
initial agents’ wallets function σi, an empty pool πi :=
{πif , πil , πim} s.t. dom(πif) = dom(πil) = dom(πim) = ∅, and the
initial assets price function pi.
R ⊆ S × S a transition relation s.t. for each state Γ,Γ′ ∈ S, (Γ,Γ′) ∈ R iff there
is a rule rA(zn), executable in Γ and Γ
rA(zn)−−−→ Γ′.
AP a set of atomic propositions.
L a labelling function associating each configuration Γ ∈ S to a set of
propositions P . P ∈ 2AP.
Table 2.2: Transition system components
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reward to a value strictly higher than 1. According to Bartoletti et al. the
default rliq equals 1.1.
8 and 9 - update the involved agents’ wallets, A repays v units of B’s loan in τ̂ and is
compensated with v′ units of τ ′
10 - ensures that the rule is executable only if B’s collateralization is less than Cmin,
which is assigned 1.5 as default value by Bartoletti et al.. This rule is the
reason why agents’ collateralization should be at least Cmin, so to avert the
risk of being liquidated and incurring in the loss of the liquidation reward rliq.
11 - prevents A from seizing a higher collateral amount than the one required for B
to be considered safe (i.e. CΓ(B) ≥ Cmin). It should be noted that Aave [13]
and Compound [42] limit the amount of repayable loan by a percentage factor
Maxliq.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the transition system for a simple running example, where
three liquidate actions are executed. The figure shows six possible traces all originating
from Γi0 and having Γ3,1 as final state. Each configuration in the figure is defined
by a row in Table 2.3. Additionally, transitions, namely Liq actions performed by
D, are indicated by different colours depending on the liquidated borrower in both
the transition system and the table. Notably, assuming Cmin = 1.5 and rliq = 1.1,
all borrowers in Γi0, A,B and C , are undercollaterized. Specifically, A is marginally
undercollaterized since CΓi0(A) = 1.25 > 1.1 = rliq, while B and C are strongly
undercollaterized, being both CΓi0(B) and CΓi0(C) below 1.1. This allows D to seize
the entire B and C ′s collateral, as evident from Γ3,1 in Table 2.3. Contrarily A’s
collateralization is restored to Cmin.
As an example, the transition Γi0
LiqD(B,91:τ1,τ ′0)−−−−−−−−−→ Γ1,2 is explained. In this case,
agent D repays 91 units of τ1, seizing 91 ·rliq ≈ 100 units of τ ′0 from agent B. Notably,
this also affects π, in a way that the funds in τ1 are incremented by 91 units, as
illustrated by πf (τ1), while B’s loan is decremented by 91 units, as shown by πl(B)(τ1).
Contrarily, πm is not modified by the transaction, as the 100 units of minted tokens
τ ′0 are simply transferred from B’s wallet to D’s one.
2.2 The Maude specification language
This section introduces the Maude language [19], some Maude utilities and con-
ventions. The Maude language is a declarative algebraic specification language,
commonly employed for either specifying or programming highly concurrent software
systems. Additionally Maude encompasses a wide range of formal verification tools
[23, 28], including a command line interpreter tool [19], which is the one employed
in this study.
Maude specifications are composed by two types of basic blocks: functional and
system modules. Thus, Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 define functional modules and system
modules, respectively. In parallel with the description of functional and system
modules, also the relevant Maude interpreter commands are explained. Subsequently,
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Figure 2.2: Example of transition system produced by the initial configuration (Γi0)
holding three liquidate actions, executed by agent D. The configurations of the graph
are defined in Table 2.3.
Γ πf
πl σA σB σC σD CΓA B C










1 A B C
Γi0 195 80 100 125 80 100 100 100 125 100 500 0 500 1.25 1 0.8
Γ1,1 245 30 100 125 80 45 100 100 125 100 450 55 500 1.5 1 0.8
Γ1,2 286 80 9 125 80 100 100 0 125 100 410 100 500 1.25 0 0.8
Γ1,3 286 80 100 34 80 100 100 100 125 0 410 100 500 1.25 1 0
Γ2,1 336 30 9 125 80 45 100 0 125 100 359 155 500 1.5 0 0.8
Γ2,2 336 30 100 34 80 45 100 100 125 0 359 155 500 1.5 1 0
Γ2,3 377 80 9 34 80 100 100 0 125 0 318 200 500 1.25 0 0
Γ3,1 427 30 9 34 80 45 100 0 125 0 268 255 500 1.5 0 0
Table 2.3: Configurations of the transition system in Figure 2.2. For simplicity, the
price function p is assumed to be constant such that p(τ0) = p(τ1) = 1 in every
configuration Γ. In this case Cmin = 1.5, rliq = 1.1 and Maxliq = 1.0.
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Section 2.2.3 introduces the notation used in order to graphically represent Maude
modules importation hierarchies. Finally, Section 2.2.4 introduces parameterised
modules by illustrating parameterised sets in Maude.
2.2.1 Functional modules
A Maude functional module can be informally viewed as a set of types and their
properties. The module MAP{X::TRIV,Y::TRIV} (in Listing 2.1) is an example of a
functional module parameterised on its key and value types X and Y, respectively,
and defining a map (or dictionary) in Maude. In the rest of this section, the module
is used to introduce the basic syntax and semantics of the constructs composing a
functional module.




3 --- Sorts and subsorts
4 sorts Entry{X,Y} Map{X,Y} .
5 subsort Entry{X,Y} < Map{X,Y} .
6
7 --- Variables
8 var D : X$Elt .
9 vars R R’ : Y$Elt .
10 var M : Map{X,Y} .
11
12 --- Operators
13 op emptyM : -> Map{X,Y} [ctor] .
14 op _|->_ : X$Elt Y$Elt -> Entry{X,Y} [ctor prec 50] .
15 op _;_ : [Map{X,Y}] Entry{X,Y} -> [Map{X,Y}]
16 [ctor assoc comm id: emptyM prec 51 format (d r os d)] .
17 op insert : X$Elt Y$Elt Map{X,Y} -> Map{X,Y} .
18
19 --- Equations and memberships
20 eq insert (D, R, M) = (M ; D |-> R) .





Listing 2.1: Definition of a map (or dictionary) in Maude, extract from Listing A.2,
Line 174, originally defined in prelude.maude, as better explained in appendix.
As it is customary in algebraic specification languages, abstract data types are
called sorts. Each sort S is identified by a capitalized name and it is declared as
in the example in Line 4. Line 4 is an example of multi-sorts declaration, defining
both a sort for a single key-value pair, Entry{X,Y}, and one for a set of such pairs,
Map{X,Y}. Subsequently, Line 5 shows how to define a basic sort hierarchy, with
Entry{X,Y} being a subsort of Map{X,Y}. Subsorts are a very powerful feature of
Maude, allowing to define subtypes sharing the properties held by their supertypes
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and extending them by defining additional ones. For instance, in this case it is natural
to define the key-value pair type as a subtype of the type identifying a key-value pair
set.
In order to specify properties of a given sort, the terms used in those properties
ought to be declared. In Maude, terms are the atomic blocks of the specified language
syntax. Terms may be declared by two statements, either a variable or an operator
statement. A variable statement instantiates a new term valid only in the current
module, whereas an operator statement is available also in super-modules5. Variable
declaration is illustrated in Lines 8 to 10, defining the variables D, R and R’ as terms
of two generic6 sorts depending on X7 and Y8, while M as a term of sort Map{X,Y}.
From this point onwards, the fact that a term t belongs to a sort S is indicated by
the notation t:S. Variables of a sort S can be thought as terms representing any
piece of syntax (even specific operators) of sort S. Their usage will be clearer, after
having introduced equation and membership statements.
An operator is a statement defining the syntax of a valid Maude term. Lines 13
to 17 present four operator instances. The first one (Line 13) is also called a constant,
as it does not support input terms, whereas the remaining (Lines 14, 15 and 17) are
non-constant operators. Given the functional module in Listing 2.1, a map from
strings to integers can be instantiated by importing the module MAP{String,Int}9.
In modules importing MAP{String,Int}, both the constant operator emptyM and
the term "key0" |-> 0 are interpreted as valid terms of sort Map{String,Int}.
Notably, the sort of the first input parameter of the operator _;_ (Line 15) as well
as the output parameter are surrounded by square brackets. When applied to sorts,
this syntax indicates kinds, i.e. particular types used to specify that a term is not
well-formed. Precisely, a term t necessarily has a kind [S], while it is not of sort
S unless it is well-formed. As a result, the operator _;_ (Line 15) generates terms
which are not necessarily well-formed. Additionally, operators are equipped with
attributes, a list of Maude keywords contained in square brackets specifying the
operators properties, as shown in Line 16. For instance, the attribute ctor, assigned
to operators in Lines 13 to 15, indicates that those operators are constructors of a
term. Constructors define the syntax of basic terms in Maude, i.e. their canonical
form. The canonical form of a given term is fully comprehended only after having
introduced the next fundamental construct: equations.
Properties of sorts are expressed via equations and memberships. Equations
allow to resolve the left-hand side term into its right-hand side equivalent term. For
instance, using the module MAP{String,Int}, the map consisting of the key "key0"
associated to the value 0 can be obtained with the insert operator Line 17, whose
semantics is specified by the equation in Line 20. The simple map is expressed by
the term insert("key0", 0, emptyM), whose canonical form is "key0" |-> 0. It
5Section 2.2.3 discusses modules composability and importing modes.
6Maude parameterised programming is more thoroughly explained in Section 2.2.4.
7I.e. X$Elt, sort of the view TRIV as defined in Listing 2.10 and explained in Section 2.2.4.
8I.e. Y$Elt.
9String and Int are sorts defined in the native Maude library, prelude.maude.
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is now clear that the canonical form of a term is an equivalent10 term specified by
the means of constructors. Remarkably, in this case, the term emptyM does not
appear in the canonical form, as the operator _;_ is defined with the attribute id:
emptyM. That attribute defines two different maps to be equal modulo the terms
emptyM they possibly contain. Consequently emptyM ; "key0" |-> 0 is equivalent
to "key0" |-> 0.
Finally, memberships define a term to be of a specific sort. For instance, by
declaring Line 21, the term "key0" |-> 0, initially of kind [Map{String,Int}], is
casted to Map{String,Int}.
Membership and equational statements may be conditional, meaning that their
validity depends on a boolean condition c. In other words, if the term t does not
satisfy c, then the conditional membership or equation having condition c do not
modify the term t. The syntax of conditional equations and memberships is omitted,
as it is very similar to the one of conditional rules, specified in Listing 2.3.
Maude (conditional) equations and memberships are the statements determining
the results generated by the reduce (or red) Maude command. The reduce command
syntax and semantics are briefly11 explained below.
- reduce in mod : t .
mod is a valid module name;
t is the term to be reduced to its corresponding canonical form as specified
by constructor operators.
The command simplifies the input term t, by applying the equational and
membership simplification corresponding to the equation and membership statements
in mod.
Formal definition More formally, a Maude functional module represents a theory
in membership equational logic, i.e. a Horn 12logic having its atomic clauses in the





for {ai}i∈[0..n] atomic clauses
(2.9)
Clavel et al. [19] define a membership equational logic theory as E := (Σ, E ∪ A)
where:
- Σ is a set of sorts and kinds;
10W.r.t. the module equations.
11A more extensive explanation can be found in [19], Section 23.
12A clause in Horn logic is defined as a disjunction of literals, having at most one positive
literal, i.e. in propositional logic u ∨
⋁︁n
i=1 ¬qi for u, {qi}i∈[1,n] literals [37]. Note that this writing is
equivalent to u←
⋀︁n
i=1 qi, recalling the form of (2.9).
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- E contains the theory equations and memberships;
- A are the axiomatic properties referred to elements of E.
Thus, the aforementioned equational simplifications can be formalized by term
reductions denoted as t→∗E t′, meaning that t is reduced to a an irreducible term t′
(i.e. canonical form), by applying equations and memberships in E for a number of
times greater or equal than zero.
The peculiarity of functional modules, which is mostly influencing their use
and application is that E must be terminating and confluent. E is defined to be
terminating when an infinite sequence of equational simplifications as in (2.10) does
not exist.
t→E t1 →E t2 · · · (2.10)
E is said to be confluent whenever (2.11) holds.
p1 := t→∗E t1 p′1 := t1 →∗E t′
if ∃ p1, p2 s.t. then ∃ p′1, p′2 s.t.
p2 := t→∗E t2 p′2 := t2 →∗E t′
(2.11)
Termination and confluence ensure the reduction of any term to be unique,
whatever the application order of its simplifications is.
2.2.2 System modules
In Maude, non-deterministic systems, such as the one in Section 2.1.3, are specified
by means of system modules by defining a syntactical Maude construct called rewrite
rules. Rewrite rules implement the behaviour of non-deterministic transitions between
two states of the specified system. The states of the system are implemented by the
Configuration sort, defined in the CONFIGURATION system module. Consequently,
this section introduces system modules by describing the Configuration sort and
the typical construct of system modules: rewrite rules.
A Configuration is regarded to as a multiset13 of Objects and Messages14, as
illustrated by the __ operator attributes in Listing 2.2.




3 sorts Oid Cid Object Msg Portal Configuration .
4 subsort Object Msg Portal < Configuration .
5 op <_:_|_> : Oid Cid AttributeSet -> Object
6 [ctor object ] .
7 op none : -> Configuration [ctor] .
13A collection which might exhibit repeats (similarly to a list), although the relative order of its
components is unimportant (like a set).
14Msg in the specifications, here Message is used for clarity.
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8 op errorConfig : -> [ Configuration ] .
9 op __ : [ Configuration ] [ Configuration ] -> [ Configuration ]





Listing 2.2: Maude definition of the generic Configuration used in the LP spec-
ifications. Extract from Listing A.7, Line 1, originally defined in prelude.maude,
as better explained in appendix.
An Object (Line 5) is used to identify an instance of a specific type in Maude,
hence it consists of three components: the object identifier (of sort Oid), the class
identifier (sort Cid) and an attribute set (sort AttributeSet), i.e. the data stored in
the object. Thus, Objects are declared with the following syntax < kO : kC | kA
>, where kO, kC and kA are constant operators returning terms of sorts Oid, Cid and
AttributeSet, respectively.
Messages (Line 3) are used as a communication means by Objects, so that
they can interact with each other. A Message is the component of a Configuration
making it dynamic, as its consumption entails a change in the current Configuration.
Rewriting rules are the statements characterising system modules and distin-
guishing them from functional ones. Rewriting rules are declared according to the
syntax in Listing 2.3, where lh is the left-hand side term, rh is the right-hand side
term and c is the rule condition. Here the semantics is slightly different than the
one used for equations and memberships: if the term matches lh and c is satisfied,
then the rule may modify the term.
crl lh => rh if c .
Listing 2.3: Syntax for a Maude conditional rewrite rule.
Maude (conditional) rewriting rules are the statements determining the results
generated by the rewrite Maude command. The rewrite command syntax and
semantics are briefly15 explained below.
- rewrite {[n]} {in mod :} t .
mod is a valid module name;
t is the term to be rewritten;
n number of rewriting rules to be applied.
The command rewrites the input term t, by applying n rewriting steps. Each
rewriting step will modify t according to a randomly selected (conditional) rewrite
rule whose left-hand side matches16 t. It should be noted, that rewrite applies
15A more extensive explanation can be found in [19], Section 23.
16In other words, it is equivalent, given the equations in module mod and its submodules.
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the rewrite rules on the terms in their canonical form. Consequently, equation and
membership statements modify the input term before rewrite rules are performed.
Lastly, arguments [n] and mod are optional, as indicated by the curly brackets. In
case [n] is not used t is rewritten for as many steps as possible, while if mod is not
indicated, the rewrite is assumed to be performed in the last declared module.
The semantics of a rewrite rule is better understood by the rule in Listing 2.4
applied via a rewrite command to the simple configuration in Listing 2.5. Listing 2.4
illustrates the way a Maude Message, in this case transfer(A0, B0, (v, tau)),
is consumed and entails a change of the system state. The rule states that an
agent, whose id is A0, is transferring v units of tau to another agent, whose id is
B0. Consequently, v units of tau are subtracted from A0’s wallet, represented by
sigmaA17, and added to B0’s one, sigmaB, as shown in the right-hand side of the rule.
Listing 2.5 shows an example of the rule application to a simple configuration, via a
rewrite command. The rewrite causes agent A to transfer 5.0 units of tau(0) to
agent B.
op transfer : Agent -Id Agent -Id
Pair{ Float0 +, Token} -> Msg [ctor] .
crl [ transfer ] :
< A0 : agState | * sigmaA >
< B0 : agState ’ | * sigmaB >
transfer (A0 , B0 , (v, tau ))
=> < A0 : agState | * sigmaA - v : tau >
< B0 : agState ’ | * sigmaB + v : tau >
if sigmaA [tau] >= v .
Listing 2.4: Simplified Maude definition of the Trf rule, as defined in Section 2.1.3.
Adapted from Listing A.7, Line 1230
rewrite < A : agState | * tau (0) |-> 10.0 >
< B : agState ’ | * tau (0) |-> 0.0 >
transfer (A0 , B0 , (5.0 , tau (0))) .
rewrites : 1 in 0ms cpu (0ms real) (~ rewrites / second )
result Configuration :
< A : agState | * tau (0) |-> 5.0 >
< B : agState ’ | * tau (0) |-> 5.0 >
Listing 2.5: Example of a rewrite command rewriting a transfer Message.
The module containing Listing 2.4 is assumed to be the last-loaded module.
At this stage, it is essential to realise that a configuration may be viewed as a
sentence in a given formal language. In the case of Maude, the language is expressed
by equational and membership statements as explained in Section 2.2.1.
17The operator *_ is the constructor of an AttributeSet, as specified in Listing A.7, Line 167.
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Formal definition More formally, a Maude system module corresponds to a theory
in rewriting logic defined as R := (E , ϕ, R) [19] where:
- E is the underlying membership equational logic (Σ, E ∪ A), as defined in
Section 2.2.1;
- ϕ is the set of kind properties (equations or memberships) whose arguments
cannot be modified by rewriting rules;
- R is a set of rewriting rules.
Consequently, Maude system modules are a generalization of functional modules.
As noticeable from the definition of R, system modules not merely define types of
terms and their properties, but they also describe how terms are to be modified
by means of rewriting rules. Rewriting rules are Maude constructs very similar to
previously introduced equations, in the way that they are pattern matching rules
allowing a specific kind of reductions, so called rewrites, to take place. However, a
rewrite differs from an equational simplification reduction in that rewriting rules are
neither necessarily terminating nor necessarily confluent. Thus, the application of
multiple rewrite rules is not guaranteed to simplify the initial term to its canonical
form. Therefore, rewrite rules are the fundamental construct for modelling dynamic
and (possibly) nondeterministic behaviours of a system.
2.2.3 Composing modules
In Maude, modules are composable, formally yielding to sub and super theories.
Three different modes of importing a module exist: protecting, extending and
including. As these mainly affect the interpretation of the Maude theorem proving
tools18, which are not employed in this study, the modes are not explained here.19
Nonetheless, the graphical notation used to indicate the different importation modes
shall be presented, in order to better understand the discussion on the developed
specification in Section 3. The notation used is inspired by [19], Section 6.3.1.. Each
box represents a module, with a blue-coloured frame denoting a functional module
and a red-coloured a system module. The relative position of a box with respect to
the connected ones signifies whether it is a super-module (importing the connected) or
a sub-module (imported by the connected). Specifically, if module M1 is placed above
a module M2 and M1, M2 are connected, M1 imports M2. Additionally, edges connecting
boxes represent the modules importation type: dashed edges indicate including,
single-solid edges indicate extending and double-solid edges indicate protecting.
The developed specifications uniquely utilise including and extending modes, as
they make the most basic assumptions of the imported model. Precisely, extending
is employed in the modules defining the testing terms, as those could cause the
importing module to have additional ground terms w.r.t. the imported, hence possibly
invalidating the protecting assumption explained in [19], Section 6.1.1.
18Such as the Inductive Theorem Prover (ITP) [28].
19The interested reader can find a thorough discussion on this in [19], Section 6.1.
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2.2.4 Parameterised modules
Module parameterisation is a Maude feature allowing to declare new datatypes by
reusing their operators logic, hence increasing reusability. Parametric modules are
either functional or system modules20, declared by the syntax in Listing 2.6.
fmod M {L0::T0 , L1::T1 , ..., Ln::Tn} is
--- sorts , operators , equations or memberships
endfm
Listing 2.6: Parameterised module syntax.
In the listing, M indicates the module name, frequently denoted by an upper-
case string. Contrarily, L0::T0, L1::T1, ..., Ln::Tn define the module’s input
parameters, or interface. A single parameter Li::Ti comprises of a label Li and
a theory Ti. The parameter label Li is used to identify the parameter inside the
module M, whereas Ti indicates the parameter functional theory. Functional theories
follow the syntax in Listing 2.7 and may contain any Maude statement defined in
Section 2.2.1. A Maude theory Ti can be thought as a set of constraints which
must be satisfied by a module bound to Ti. In fact, a parameterised module M is
instantiated by binding a functional module FMi to each parameter Li::Ti such that
FMi satisfies the properties defined by Ti. This association is performed by a view, a
Maude construct, used to bind functional modules to the respective theories. Views
consist of simple statements mapping functional modules’ sorts and operators to
compatible theories’ sorts and operators.
fth FT is
--- sorts , operators , equations or memberships
endfth
Listing 2.7: Functional theory syntax.
In order to clarify the instantiation of a parameterised module, the rest of the
section discusses how to define a set of integers in Maude. This is achieved by
only employing Maude native modules, shipped with Maude v3.0 in the library
prelude.maude21. Listing 2.8 illustrates the SET{X::TRIV} module parameterised
by the TRIV functional theory in Listing 2.10. Conversely, Listing 2.11 shows the INT
module and Listing 2.9 illustrates the view Int, binding INT to TRIV. As the TRIV
theory consists of the only sort Elt, the Int view simply binds the Int sort22 in INT
to Elt, Listing 2.9 Line 2. As a consequence, by binding the module INT to TRIV,
the Int sort will be accessible from the parameterized module SET{X :: TRIV} by
20This thesis requires to define only functional parameterized modules. The reader interested in
parameterised system modules can find a thorough discussion in [19], Section 6.3.
21Henceforth, modules shipped with Maude v3.0 will be referred to as native Maude modules or
Maude library. Maude v3.0 is a free software project distributed under GNU-GPLv2.0 and available
at [49].
22This sort defines a Maude integer.
29
the view sort X$Elt. The binding of INT to TRIV is achieved via the Int view by the
importation instruction including SET{Int}. Graphically, the binding is indicated
by the gray solid line in Figure 2.3. As a result, including SET{Int} defines a sort
Set{Int}, supersort of Int, represented as X$Elt in Listing 2.8 Line 5. Finally, the
operator _,_, in Line 8, can be used to generate non-empty sets of integers, hence
{1, 2, 3} is modelled as the term 1, 2, 3 of sort Set{Int}.
1 fmod SET{X :: TRIV} is
2 protecting EXT -BOOL .
3 protecting NAT .
4 sorts NeSet{X} Set{X} .
5 subsort X$Elt < NeSet{X} < Set{X} .
6
7 op empty : -> Set{X} [ctor] .
8 op _,_ : Set{X} Set{X} -> Set{X}
9 [ctor assoc comm id: empty prec 121
10 format (d r os d)] .
11






Listing 2.8: Definition of the SET{X :: TRIV} functional module. Extract from
prelude.maude library.
1 view Int from TRIV to INT is
2 sort Elt to Int .
3 endv
Listing 2.9: Definition of the Int view from TRIV to INT. Extract from
prelude.maude library.
1 fth TRIV is
2 sort Elt .
3 endfth
Listing 2.10: Definition of the TRIV functional theory. Extract from
prelude.maude library.
1 fmod INT is
2 protecting NAT .
3 sorts NzInt Int .
4 subsorts NzNat < NzInt Nat < Int .
5
6 op -_ : NzNat -> NzInt
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Figure 2.3: Graphical notation to indicate a binding of a functional module to
parameter via a theory.
h
Figure 2.4: Example of a generic reachability analysis.
7 [ctor
8 special (id -hook MinusSymbol
9 op -hook succSymbol (s_ : Nat ~> NzNat)






Listing 2.11: Definition of the INT functional module. Extract from
prelude.maude library.
2.3 Prerequisites for the supported analyses
This section explains the prerequisites to comprehend the analyses supported by
the formal verification tool detailed in Sections 3 and 4. Specifically, Section 2.3.1
discusses reachability analysis [6, 10, 19] and the Maude command to perform it.
Section 2.3.2 offers a simple definition for the basic Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [6]
formula utilised in Section 5.2.2. Finally, Section 2.3.3 outlines MultiVeStA [48, 53],
the Java tool used to perform the statistical analysis in Section 5.3.
2.3.1 Reachability analysis
Reachability analysis is a formal verification technique applicable to transition
systems (S, I, R,AP, L) as the one defined in Section 2.1.3, where I consists of the
only configuration Gamma^i. In fact, the analysis receives two input parameters: an
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initial state Gamma^i and a condition cond. The analysis operates by traversing the
entire transition system resulting from the application of all possible rewriting rules
on Gamma^i and its successors. Finally, the analysis outputs the list of configurations
reachable from Gamma^i and satisfying cond. A graphical example of the analysis
is given in Figure 2.4. The illustrated reachability analysis is instantiated with
initial configuration Γi and condition AP = {ψ}. The resulting graph represents
a transition system whose edges indicate a rewrite rule execution and where each
state Γ contains the proposition P s.t. P ∈ 2AP ∩ L(Γ). The output set comprises
the grey-coloured states, i.e. {Γ ∈ S | ψ ∈ L(Γ)} = {Γ1, Γ3, Γ4, Γ6, Γ7}.
In Maude, reachability analysis is conducted by issuing a search command. A
basic23 syntax of a search is given below.
- search in mod : subj searchtype patt such that cond .
mod a valid module name;
subj term representing the initial state Gamma^i0;
searchtype maximum number of rewriting steps24 to reach the list of solutions;
patt searched pattern, comprising a variable v of sort S, denoted as v:S;
cond condition which is to be satisfied by the configurations in the output
list.
Additionally, it is given a brief description of the command semantics assumed in
the rest of this thesis. The search command executes a search of the states reachable
from the initial term (subj) by applying a number of rewrite steps, i.e. consuming a
number of Messages contained in the initial configuration. The command employs
the syntax patt such that cond in order to filter the "interesting" states, i.e. those
matching patt and satisfying cond within a number of steps specified by searchtype.
Those states are returned in an ordered list. Contrarily, in case no reachable state
satisfies cond or matches patt, an empty list is returned.
2.3.2 Linear Temporal Logic
This thesis refers to Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) as an extension of propositional
logic complemented with temporal operators: namely, □ always, ♢ eventually,
next and U until. Since only the □ operator is required for a sound understanding
of the thesis, other operators are omitted25.
Given the transition system TS := (S, I, R,AP, L), defined in Section 2.1.3, it is
provided the semantics of "TS satisfies □ ϕ", denoted as TS |= □ ϕ, with ϕ ∈ AP
proposition. However, in order to give a meaningful definition, additional notation
shall be introduced.
23A more extensive explanation can be found in [19], Section 23.
24This could be one (=>1), one or more (=>+), zero or more (=>*) and only terms which cannot
be further rewritten (=>!).
25The interested reader may want to refer to [6], Chapter 5, for a complete discussion of the LTL
syntax and semantics.
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A path Π in TS is defined as (2.12).
Π := (Γ0,Γ1, ...,Γk) s.t.
Γ0 ∈ I ∧ (2.12)
(Γi,Γi+1) ∈ R ∀ i ∈ [0..k)
For instance, in Figure 2.4, (Γi,Γ3,Γ7) is a path. Subsequently, as it is natural,
a state Γ ∈ S is said to satisfy an atomic proposition ϕ ∈ AP iff ϕ ∈ L(Γ).
Additionally, (2.13) expresses the semantics of Π |= □ϕ, i.e. "path Π satisfies always
ϕ".
Π |= □ ϕ iff Γ |= ϕ ∀ Γ ∈ Π (2.13)
In Figure 2.4, (Γ3,Γ7) is an example of a path satisfying ψ.
Finally, (2.14) defines the semantics of TS |= □ ϕ.
TS |= □ ϕ iff Π |= □ ϕ for all paths Π in TS (2.14)
Now, it can be observed that the transition system defined in Figure 2.4 does not
satisfy □ ψ. In fact, no path having Γi as first state satisfies □ ψ.
A more precise semantics for TS |= □ ϕ, relying on the definition of the language
of atomic propositions satisfying a given LTL formula, can be found in [6], Section
5.1.2.
2.3.3 MultiVeStA: a tool for statistical analyses
MultiVeStA [48, 53, 51] is a Java tool which can be employed to conduct statistical
analyses for estimating quantitative properties of discrete-time models. The Multi-
VeStA approach is based on confidence interval (CI) estimation achieved through the
execution of a varying number of Monte Carlo simulations [48]. In general, given a
simulator of the model, a property to be estimated and a few statistical parameters,
MultiVeStA produces a statistically-valid approximation of the quantitative property
as displayed by the model. Specifically, in order to better understand the tool
functioning, it is essential to examine each input given to MultiVeStA and detail the
produced output.
First, the tool expects a discrete-time simulator reproducing the behaviour of the
model under analysis. Such a model can be developed in several languages (including
Java, R, C++, Python, Maude), although MultiVeStA fully-supports only few of
them26. In the case the simulator is implemented in a language other than the
ones fully-supported, MultiVeStA requires the modeller to perform an additional
integration step [48]. That is the implementation of a Java class wrapping the
model simulator and extending the class NewState. NewState is to be viewed as the
MultiVeStA interface to the underlying model simulator, allowing the tool to directly
control the underlying model transitions and current state. For instance, in the case
26Java, R, C++ and Python.
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Figure 2.5: Two MultiVeStA execution traces (solid lines), generated by executing a
generic simulator. Dashed lines indicate other possible execution scenarios.
of Maude, the NewState subclass controls the Maude simulator by starting a Maude
interpreter session as an external process27. Consequently, the MultiVeStA NewState
objects contain the current configuration of the underlying model. In other words,
they represent the states in the computation graph of the ongoing simulation, as
illustrated in Figure 2.5. Besides, the figure illustrates that each simulation generates
a different execution trace, as at each step NewState uniformly selects the next state.
Consequently each simulation can be regarded to as a reproducible28 Monte Carlo
experiment. An essential method of NewState is rval(String obs), which, given a
property identifier obs, returns the value of the queried variable as a real number.
In practice, an observed value of a variable is queried in a MultiQuaTEx property
and derived from the underlying model configuration, via the NewState object.
Second, MultiVeStA properties are expressed in MultiQuaTEx, whose minimal
syntax is defined in Listing 2.1229.
1 MQ : := DS EP
2 EP : := eval parametric (EL , x1 , min , max , s )
3 EL : := list of E [ PExp ]
4 DS : := set of DefOp
5 DefOp : := N(x1, ..., xm ) = PExp ;
6 SExp : := c | rval ( i ) | F(SExp1, ..., SExpk ) | xj
7 PExp : := SExp | #N(SExp1 , . . . , SExpn ) |
8 if SExp then PExp1 else PExp2 fi
Listing 2.12: MultiQuaTEx syntax, simplified from [48].
27By using the ExpectJ library.
28To achieve experiments reproducibility, a seeding mechanism is in place.
29Refer to [48] for the complete formal syntax.
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From the syntax, we observe that a MultiQuaTEx formula is defined as a set of
operator definitions (DefOp) and a parametric evaluation of a list of expected value
observations (EL). DefOp is an operator definition, comprising the operator signature
on left-hand side and a path expression (PExp) on the right-hand side. Contrarily,
a parametric evaluation is a construct introduced by Sebastio et al. [48], allowing
to execute a list of observations (EL) for each x1 ∈ [min,max], incrementing x1 by
s units. It should be noted that the expected values of the observations (E[PExp])
are calculated w.r.t. the computed Monte Carlo simulations. Additionally, a path
expression, PExp, is defined as either a simple state expression SExp or recursively as a
compound of PExp. Specifically, the syntax #N(SExp1, ..., SExpn) issues the function
call N(...) in the next state of the current simulation. The statement if g then x else
y fi has the semantics that if the guard g is satisfied in the current state, then the
path expression x is evaluated, otherwise y. Lastly, SExp is an expression calculated
in a simulation state; it can either be a boolean condition (c), a query for the given
observation i (rval(i)), an arithmetic or boolean expression (F(SExp1, ..., SExpk))
or a variable. Listing 4.6 illustrates an example of a MultiQuaTEx property.
Finally, MultiVeStA expects the parameters defining the required confidence
interval: the statistical confidence (α) and the CI precision (δ). The usage of
these parameters is explained by the following example. Given a model variable
X, whose unknown value is x, MultiVeStA approximates x with x̂. The resulting
approximation x̂ is computed by executing a number of simulations n large enough
that x̂ ∈ [x− δ2 , x+
δ
2 ] with probability 1− α. It should be noted, that this happens
for a varying, even though frequently large n. This is due to the fact that the distance
between the current approximation and the actual value is estimated as d̂ (2.15) [53].





In (2.15), k is regarded to as a constant, n as the number of simulations and ŝ as
the sample variance of X value over the n observations. Consequently, we observe
that d̂ decreases at the speed of the square root function and x̂ is accepted, only
when d̂ ≤ δ2 .
2.4 Notions on stock market modelling
This section introduces basic notions of stock market modelling based on historical
data. Section 2.4.1 offers an intuitive understanding of the geometric Brownian
motion as the means to achieve a feasible predictive model based on past stock
market trends.
35
2.4.1 The geometric Brownian motion
The geometric Brownian motion (GBM) is the continuous-time stochastic process
defined in (2.16).









In the equation, the two constants µ and σ are respectively called drift and




Formally, a Weiner process Wt is defined as the process (2.17) satisfying the
following properties:
1. ϵ ∼ N(0, 1)30;
2. for any given pair (t0, t′0), Wt0 and Wt′0 are independent.
In other words, a Wt is the component yielding the stochastic behaviour of a
GBM. Additionally, the geometric Brownian motion as a whole can be viewed as
the harmonic result of two components [31]:





2. the volatility component σWt.
The effects of the two aforementioned components on the resulting process is
shown in Figure 2.6.
As it is evident from the figure, the drift component defines the trend of the
resulting process, whereas the volatility component is a measure of the randomly
sampled shocks. Intuitively, this signifies that negative values for µ yield to a
downward prediction trend, whereas positive ones to a growth. Oppositely, the
higher the σ is, the more significantly the prices predictions change.
In the literature [21, 31], the two constants µ and σ are estimated based on
the daily log returns of the targeted stock market. Given the closing prices of two
consecutive trading days C1 and C2, the log return w.r.t. the second trading day is
defined as ln(C2)− ln(C1).
30It denotes that ϵ follows a standard normal distribution.
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Figure 2.6: The geometric Brownian motion components.
37
3 A Maude specification of Lending Pools
This chapter discusses a Maude specification of the lending pools model presented in
Section 2.1.3. This specification will allow to automatically simulate the LP rules
on arbitrary configurations. Subsequently, in Section 4, this development will be
extended in order to conduct statistical analysis on LP.
Specifically, Section 3.1 describes the basic types required to model LP configura-
tions. Section 3.2 outlines the implementation of the model rules. Finally, Section 3.3
discusses the language features used for the model parameterisation and testing.
As reminded in each listing throughout this chapter, Appendix A contains the
essential modules of the developed specification. The full specification is open source,
under the GNU General Public License version 2 at [38].
3.1 The model basic components
This section describes the Maude modules developed in order to represent the basic
components of an LP configuration. Section 3.1.1 overviews the tokens type system
and introduces the abstraction implementing mathematical functions. Section 3.1.2
exemplifies the usage of such abstraction, defining an essential component of an LP
configuration: a pool.
3.1.1 Tokens
The model formalised by Bartoletti et al. [7] heavily relies on basic mathematical
concepts including sets and functions, mainly in order to formalise the mechanisms
used for transferring tokens among parties. Consequently, the tokens abstraction
is used by this section to explain how these mathematical means, namely sets and
functions, have been defined in Maude. In order to achieve this, the section discusses
how the following concepts, defined in Section 2.1.3, have been specified:
1. the basic token types, minted and free tokens;
2. the sets of token types, Tf ⊆ Tf and Tm ⊆ Tm;
3. the functions from token types to non-negative real numbers, σA, for agent A.
Distinguishing between free and minted tokens is essential in order to specify LP.
Precisely, it is desirable to model τi and τ ′i ∀ i ∈ N as respectively free and minted
tokens. Listing 3.1 shows how this is obtained in Maude. For instance, the operators
tau(_) and _’, in Lines 6 and 7, allow to specify τ0 with the term tau(0) and τ ′0
with tau(0)’, respectively of sort Free-Token and Minted-Token. Notably, free
and minted tokens are defined as subsorts, Free-Token, Minted-Token, of Token
(Lines 3 and 4).





3 sort Token Free -Token Minted -Token .




6 op tau(_) : Nat -> Free -Token [ctor ...] .





Listing 3.1: Maude definition of Free-Token and Minted-Token, extract from
Listing A.3, Line 8
In order to manage several free and minted tokens, two types for sets of token
types have been developed: Set{Free-Token} and Set{Minted-Token}. For ex-
ample, the two types allow to specify the set of free tokens {τ0, τ1, τ2} as the term
tau(0), tau(1), tau(2) of sort Set{Free-Token}. Conversely, the set of minted
tokens {τ ′0, τ ′1, τ ′2} is expressible as the term tau(0)’, tau(1)’, tau(2)’ of sort
Set{Minted-Token}. The parametric module SET{X::TRIV}31 is used to implement
Set{Free-Token} and Set{Minted-Token}, representing free and minted tokens
sets, respectively. Similarly to the relation we have observed in Listing 3.1, also
Set{Free-Token} and Set{Minted-Token} are defined as subsorts of Set{Token}.
This is achieved by the parameterised module SUBSET{X::TRIV, Y::TRIV}32 in List-
ing A.3, Line 44, which allows to define "mixed" token type sets such as {τ0, τ1, τ ′1}
as tau(0),tau(1), tau(1)’:Set{Token}.
Functions are the last abstraction which serves to model essential LP objects,
including agents’ wallets, πf , πm and πl. Consequently, it is desirable to define
functions, as per their usual mathematical definition33, in a parametric manner. In
this sense, the sorts Map{X,Y}, Set{X} and Set{Y} are employed: Map{X,Y} can be
used to store the pairs composing a function, as shown in Section 2.2.1, while Set{X}
and Set{Y} for the definition of the operators computing the function domain and
codomain. Listing 3.2 shows the approach used to define a generic function offering
the operations for determining its domain (dom) and codomain (cod34). Notably, the
FUNCTION module is parameterised with respect to a MAP-THEORY, MT, acting as the
entity binding Map{X,Y} with the sorts corresponding to its domain (Set{X}) and
codomain (Set{Y}). The operator dom is defined via the operator $dom which utilises
all the sorts and operators of MT, in order to produce a set of MT$D-sorted terms.
Listing 3.3 illustrates the sorts and operators of a MAP-THEORY, described below.
E, M - represent respectively an Entry{X,Y} and a Map{X,Y};
31The parameterised module SET{X::TRIV} and the view TRIV are defined in Listings 2.8 and 2.10,
respectively.
32Listing A.2, Line 101.
33A function f of domain D and codomain C, denoted as f : D → C, is defined as f ⊆
D × C and ∀c ∈ C ∃! d ∈ D . (d, c) ∈ f .
34For brevity, only the implementation of dom is illustrated, as cod is analogous.
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D, DT - define the domain type (in the form of Set{X}) and its elements’ type (X);
C, CT - model the codomain type (in the form of Set{Y}) and its elements’ type (Y).
Similarly, the operators in MAP-THEORY are defined as the main operators in
MAP{X::TRIV,Y::TRIV} and SET{X::TRIV}, as further explained.
_|->_ - is syntactically equivalent to the constructor for a term of sort Entry{X,Y},
_|->_, Listing 2.1 Line 14.
_;_ - is syntactically equivalent to the constructor for a term of sort [Map{X,Y}],
_;_, Listing 2.1 Line 15.
_,_ - is syntactically equivalent to the constructor of non-empty Set{X} in Listing 2.8
Line 8.
1 fmod FUNCTION {MT :: MAP - THEORY } is
2 var map : MT$M .
3 var domElt : MT$DT .
4 var codElt : MT$CT .
5 var domSet : MT$D .
6 var codSet : MT$C .
7
8 --- dom implements the function domain as a set
9 --- of MT$D - sorted terms
10 op dom : MT$M -> MT$D .
11 eq dom(map) = $dom(map , emptyD ) .
12
13 --- $dom is dom auxilary function , implementing
14 --- the actual logic to iterate over the map and
15 --- extract its values
16 op $dom : MT$M MT$D -> MT$D .
17 eq $dom (( map ; domElt |-> codElt ), domSet ) =
18 $dom(map , (domSet , domElt )) .
19 eq $dom (( domElt |-> codElt ), domSet ) = domSet , domElt .
20 eq $dom(emptyM , domSet ) = domSet .
21
22 --- cod implements the function codomain as a set
23 --- of MT$C - sorted terms






Listing 3.2: Maude definition of the FUNCTION main functionalities: dom and cod,
extract from Listing A.2, Line 285
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1 fth MAP - THEORY is
2 sorts M E DT CT D C .
3
4 --- entry (pair) is subsort of map (set of pairs)
5 subsort E < M .
6 --- constructing the map pairs
7 op _|->_ : DT CT -> E [ctor] .
8 --- ‘assoc ‘ and ‘comm ‘ make map pairs unordered
9 op _;_ : [M] E -> [M] [ctor id: emptyM assoc comm prec
10 121 format (d r os d)] .
11 --- empty pair
12 op emptyM : -> M .
13
14 --- CT is the sort of the terms in Set{C}
15 subsort CT < C .
16 --- DT is the sort of the terms in Set{D}
17 subsort DT < D .
18
19 --- operator to be bound to (empty ). Set{C}
20 op emptyC : -> C .
21 --- operator to be bound to (_,_). Set{C}
22 op _,_ : C CT -> C
23 [ctor assoc comm prec 121 format (d r os d)] .
24
25 --- operator to be bound to (empty ). Set{D}
26 op emptyD : -> D .
27 --- operator to be bound to (_,_). Set{D}
28 op _,_ : D DT -> D
29 [ctor assoc comm prec 121 format (d r os d)] .
30 endfth
Listing 3.3: Maude definition of MAP-THEORY, binding Map{X,Y} with Set{X}
and Set{Y}, extract from Listing A.2, Line 229
As exemplified in Section 3.1.2, this approach allows the modeller to instantiate
a function by reusing the logic in Listing 3.2 to compute its domain and codomain,
by module parameterisation35. This is achieved following the procedure36:
1. defining a generic module <FUN-MOD> containing the sorts and operators to be
bound to MAP-THEORY ones;
2. producing a generic view <FUN-VIEW> binding <FUN-MOD> to MAP-THEORY;
3. instantiating the function by including FUNCTION{<FUN-VIEW>} .
As a result, the module importing FUNCTION{<FUN-VIEW>} is equipped with sort
Map{X,Y} and the operators dom and cod returning respectively a Set{X}-typed
domain and a Set{Y}-typed codomain.
35Section 2.2.4 outlines Maude parametric programming.
36More extensively described in [19], Section 6.3.4.
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Figure 3.1: Importation graph of the LP functional module
3.1.2 Pools
The Maude implementation of a pool, π, defined in Section 2.1.3, is based on
FUNCTION{MT::MAP-THEORY}, as shown in Figure 3.1. The figure depicts the modules
imported in LP, which implement the main functionalities of π. The pool components
(functions πf , πl and πm) are modelled via FUNCTION{MT} and instantiated by means
of the views PiFFun, PiLFun and PiMFun binding the specific FUNCTION{MT} operators
and sorts to MAP-THEORY ones. The remaining included module, namely WALLET,
defines basic operations on wallets which are useful to specify π.
In order to clarify the usage of FUNCTION, the rest of the section describes
PI-FUND, the module containing the specification for πf 37. Listing 3.4 illustrates how
to instantiate FUNCTION{MT} by the view PiFFun.
1 fmod PI -FUND is





Listing 3.4: Maude definition of PI-FUND, extract from Listing A.5, Line 38
Listing 3.5 fully specifies the way the binding, operated by the view, is achieved.
Specifically, the Map underlying πf 38 (MT$M, in FUNCTION{M}, Listing A.2, Line 286)
is a Map from a Token to a Float0+39. As a result, the basic sorts for domain and
codomain elements, DT and CT, are bound to Token and Float0+. Similarly, the
domain and codomain sorts, D and C, are bound to Set{Token} and Set{Float0+}, re-
spectively. Additionally, it is worth observing that FUNCTION{PiFFun} not only offers
37PI-LOAN and PI-MINT are developed similarly so to model the remaining pool components: πl
and πm.
38Defined in the original formal model as a function mapping a free token type to a rational
number.
39A real non-negative number.
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the means to model wallets40, but it is also fundamental for defining FUNCTION{PiLFun}41
and FUNCTION{PiMFun}. In fact, as shown in Figure 3.1, FUNCTION{PiFFun} is in-
cluded in SUBTOKEN-FUNCTIONS, the module representing the sorts and operators
bound by PiLFun and PiMFun.
1 view PiFFun from MAP - THEORY
2 to TOKEN -MAP is
3 sort M to Map{Token , Float0 +} .
4 sort E to Entry{Token , Float0 +} .
5
6 sort DT to Token .
7 sort CT to Float0 + .
8
9 sort D to Set{Token} .
10 sort C to Set{ Float0 +} .
11
12 op emptyD to empty .
13 op emptyC to empty .
14 endv
Listing 3.5: Maude definition of PiFFun, the view binding MAP-THEORY to the
sorts and operators specifying πf , extract from Listing A.5, Line 106
3.2 LP rules
This chapter draws the attention on specification of the LP actions in Maude. First,
Section 3.2.1 defines the LP configurations modelled in Maude. Second, Section 3.2.2
examines the semantics of the object-based approach and motivates the main changes
to the initial model notation.
3.2.1 Configurations definition
Listing 3.6 expresses an example of a simple LP configuration in Maude.
[
Pi | p
(< A : noState | * sigma_A >
< B : noState | * sigma_B >
< C : noState | * sigma_C >)
< R(n) : Round | none >
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin(cminV),
Rliq(rliqV) >
] :: ClosedConfiguration
Listing 3.6: Maude definition of a simple LP configuration
The Maude representation of a (Message-less42) LP configuration comprises nearly
40As defined in Section 2.1.3.
41Note that its codomain can be modelled as a Map{Token, Float0+}.
42Section 3.2.2 discusses LP configuration holding messages.
43
Figure 3.2: Importation graph of the BC-LP-CONFIGURATION system module
the same components, as discussed in Section 2.1.3. Firstly, Pi | p is a term of sort
BC{LP}, defined as an Object in Listing A.7, Line 58. The term pi models the pool
π state. Conversely, p models the assets price function, p, via a simple Map{Token,
Float0+}. Secondly, a generic object of the form < Id : noState | * sigma_Id >
represents an agent identified by Id, having a noState behaviour43 and holding
a wallet sigma_Id44. Thirdly, the term < R(n) : Round | none > is an Object
added to the configuration in order to store the n-th blockchain round. Finally, <
P(0) : LiqParams | CMin(cminV), Rliq(rliqV) > is employed to parameterise
the configuration given by CMin (cminV) and Rliq45. (rliqV) parameters, as shown
in Section 3.3.1. Additionally, it is worth noting that the sort of a LP configura-
tion term is ClosedConfiguration. A ClosedConfiguration is obtained from a
Configuration by the operator [_] : Configuration -> ClosedConfiguration,
as shown in Listing 3.6. As Section 3.2.2 shows, this is a fundamental operator in
order to modify only specific components of a Configuration, while maintaining
the rest intact.
The full implementation of LP configuration is contained in BC-LP-CONFIGURATION,
whose main dependencies are pictured in Figure 3.2. Specifically, BC{LP} con-
tains the sorts and operators discussed in Section 3.1.2, whereas CONFIGURATION
is the essential system module explained in Section 2.2.2. Next, AGENT-STATE and
BC-LP-CONFIG-COMPONENTS define additional syntactic sugar, mainly destructuring
operators, which allow to decompose a Configuration into its atomic components.
Lastly, LP-PARAMETERS defines the lending pools essential parameters discussed in
Section 3.3.1.
3.2.2 Translating LP actions into Maude rules
As stated in Section 3.2.1, the objects abstraction is essential for defining LP actions.
Specifically, Objects (in case of lending pools, the agents and the pool) need to
43Section 4 details a specific behaviour type.
44Wallet of agent identified by Id, σId in Section 3.1.2.
45Namely, Cmin and rliq.
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interact with one another by means of Messages. In these specifications, LP actions
are syntactically modelled as Messages, whereas their semantics are specified by the
rewriting rules consuming those Messages. As a result, the LP rule rA(zn) of a given
arity n is syntactically defined as the Maude operator in Listing 3.7.
op r : Agent -Id S1 ... Sn -> Message .
Listing 3.7: Syntax of a message representing an issued LP actions in Maude.
In the listing, S1...Sn are the sorts of the terms t1...tn representing the n input
parameters zn. Contrarily, the first input parameter of the operator r is a term
A:Agent-Id, identifying the agent issuing the message. Consequently, the action
rA(zn) is represented in Maude by r(A, t1, ..., tn):Message.
However, actions cannot be implemented as mere syntactic constructs, since they
directly imply a system state change, whose semantics ought to be defined. This
is exactly the purpose of the rewriting rules subsequently discussed. Specifically,
conditional rewriting rules, following the syntax in Listing 3.8, are used to model LP
actions semantics.
crl [r-id] :
[ gamma r(A:Agent -Id , t1:S1 , ..., tn:Sn) ]
=> [ gamma ’ ]
if G(gamma , A, t1 , ..., tn) .
Listing 3.8: A generic Maude rewrite rule expressing the semantics of an LP
action.
Here, [r-id] is the rule identifier, mainly used for debugging purposes, whereas
gamma and gamma’ are terms of sort Configuration, representing respectively the
system state before46 and after the rewrite occurs. Next, r(A, t1, ..., tn) is
the message whose consumption entails the transition from state gamma to gamma’
according to the semantics expressed by gamma’ and G(gamma, A, t1, ..., tn).
Lastly, G(gamma, A, t1, ..., tn) (also named a guard) is a proposition, which
given the left-hand side terms, allows the rule to be executed only if it is eval-
uated to true. Thus, intuitively, the aforementioned rule can be executed in a
state [ gamma0 ] if and only if gamma0 contains r(A, t1, ..., tn):Message47
and G(gamma0, A, t1, ..., tn) is true. Noteworthily, the implementation choice
of the ClosedConfiguration constructor ([_]) is essential to match the unmodified
Objects of gamma0 against the rule left-hand side.
As a result, a rewriting rule implementing the LP action rA(zn) induces the
consumption of the message r(A, t1, ..., tn). Clearly, the rewrite application
yields changes to the initial configuration according to the semantics of the LP action.
The rest of this section exemplifies this point, by describing the liquidate LP action
LiqA(B, v : τ̂ , τ ′), as defined in Figure 2.1.
46Modulo r(A, t1, ..., tn).
47For some A, t1, ..., tn terms of sorts Agent-Id, S0, ..., Sn
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1 crl [ liquidate ] : --- i. represents the i-th
2 [ gamma --- constraint in the liquidate
3 < R(r) : Round | none > --- action def ( Figure 2.1)
4 < A : agState | * sigmaA >
5 < B : agState ’ | * sigmaB >
6 (pi | p)
7 liquidate (A, B, (v, hTau), tau ’) ]
8 => [ gamma
9 < R(r + 1) : Round | none >
10 < A : agState | * sigmaA ’ >
11 < B : agState ’ | * sigmaB ’ >
12 (pi ’ | p) ]
13 if v’ := v * (p[hTau] / (p[(pi).u(tau ’)])) * --- 4.
14 (gamma ). Rliq /\
15 sigmaA ’ := ( sigmaA - v : hTau) + v’ : tau ’ /\ --- 8.
16 sigmaB ’ := sigmaB - v’ : tau ’ /\ --- 9.
17 (gamma < A : agState | * sigmaA >
18 < B : agState ’ | * sigmaB >
19 (pi | p) ).C(B) < (gamma ). CMin /\ --- 10.
20 gamma ’ := gamma --- final config
21 < A : agState | * sigmaA ’ > --- after rule
22 < B : agState ’ | * sigmaB ’ > --- application
23 (pi ’ | p) /\
24 (gamma ’).C(B) <= (gamma ). CMin . --- 11.
Listing 3.9: Definition of LiqA(B, v : τ̂ , τ ′) in Maude, simplified extract from
Listing A.7, Line 1188. Apart from the removed rules, the only modification to
the appendix is the renaming of tau in hTau. This is to align the notation with
Figure 2.1.
In the liquidate rule, the left-hand side matches (i.e. it can be applied to) any con-
figuration containing a liquidate message involving two existing users and satisfying
the rule condition. The condition is a simplification of the original, showing the action
semantics of the essential constraints48 detailed in Section 2.1.3. Initially, it should be
noted that only the components destructured from the left-hand side Configuration
are modified by the action: liquidator (A) and borrower (B) agents49, blockchain
round object and (pi | p). Obviously, the input terms to the liquidate message50
are utilised as well. Subsequently, the rule condition shows how these parameters are
used, explaining the exact action behaviour. First, matching equation having v’ as
the left-hand side assigns to v’ the units of tau’, i.e. the amount of the liquidation
seized collateral. Second, the liquidator and borrower’s initial balances are updated
reflecting the fact that the liquidator repays v units of hTau (borrower’s loan) in
return for v’ units of tau’. Third, it is verified that the collateralization of B in the
left-hand side configuration is below CMin51. Lastly, the final ClosedConfiguration
48The preconditions 4 , 8 , 9 , 10 and 11 in Figure 2.1.
49Henceforth, agent Objects will be referred to by their id term of sort Oid.
50A, B, (v, hTau), tau’
51The configuration destructors of CMin ((gamma).CMin) and of the other LP parameters are
discussed in Section 3.3.1.
46
(gamma’) is reconstructed from the updated objects52 and B’s collateralization, based
on gamma’, is compared to CMin. Thus, the condition is satisfied, i.e. the rule is
executable, if and only if the borrower’s collateralization is less or equal than CMin,
after the action has been executed53.
3.3 The model specifications
This section summarises the current specifications development, underlining two
particularly desirable properties expected from any high-quality piece of software:
parameterization capability and testability. Specifically, Section 3.3.1 discusses
the parameters which could be used to instantiate an LP configuration, whereas
Section 3.3.2 focusses on the Maude features employed for testing the specifications.
3.3.1 The model parameterization
The lending pools model ought to have a number of parameters in order to offer a
more realistic representation of the underlying financial platforms. Consequently,
the Maude specification of LP should expose functionalities in order to set and
modify those parameters. The model can be instantiated by choosing at least three
parameters (Cmin, rliq and Maxliq), introduced in Section 2.1.3. The respective terms
specifying them in Maude are presented below.
CMin - the threshold indicating the minimum collateralization a user may have
without risking to be liquidated. It models Cmin.
Rliq - the discount rate applied to the amount of tokens seized by the liquidator
during a liquidation. It models rliq.
Maxliq - threshold expressing the maximum amount of repayable loan during a single
liquidation. It models Maxliq.
These parameters are defined in LP-PARAMETERS54, and the value of CMin and
Rliq can be modified via the operator replaceLiqParams, in Listing 3.10 Line 20.
Notably, the operator either inserts a new Object of class LiqParams55 (Line 30)
or it updates the current CMin and Rliq values (Line 32). Therefore, reducing the
term (gamma).replaceLiqParams(1.5, 1.1) determines that CMin is set to 1.5
and Rliq to 1.1. The new values are then accessed through gamma’s destructors
defined in Listing 3.11. Examples of their usage can be observed in Listing 3.9
Lines 14 and 19 for Rliq and CMin, correspondingly.




52Namely A, B and pi’, whose update is not shown in Listing 3.9
53I.e. when the system is in state gamma’.
54Listing A.7, Line 111
55As shown in Listing 3.6
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3 --- operator used to insert a new ‘LiqParams ‘ object
4 op addLiqParams (_,_,_) : Configuration Float0 +
5 Float0 + ->
6 Configuration .
7 --- equation inserting the new object
8 eq addLiqParams (gamma , cminV , rliqV) =
9 gamma < P(0) : LiqParams | CMin(cminV),
10 Rliq(rliqV) > .
11 --- operator wrapping the ‘Configuration ‘ into a
12 --- ‘closedConfiguration ‘
13 op addLiqParams (_,_,_) : closedConfiguration Float0 +
14 Float0 + ->
15 closedConfiguration .
16 eq addLiqParams (cGamma , cminV , rliqV) =
17 [ addLiqParams (( cGamma ). config , cminV , rliqV) ] .
18
19 --- operator updating ‘CMin ‘ and ‘Rliq ‘ values
20 op (_). replaceLiqParams (_,_) : closedConfiguration
21 Float0 + Float0 +
22 -> closedConfiguration .
23 eq ( cGamma ). replaceLiqParams (cminV , rliqV) =
24 [ (( cGamma ). config ). $replaceLiqParams (none ,
25 cminV , rliqV) ] .
26 op (_). $replaceLiqParams (_,_,_) : Configuration
27 Configuration
28 Float0 + Float0 +
29 -> Configuration .
30 eq (none ). $replaceLiqParams (gamma ’, cminV , rliqV) =
31 addLiqParams (gamma ’, cminV , rliqV) .
32 eq (gamma < P(0) : LiqParams | attrS >)
33 . $replaceLiqParams (gamma ’, cminV , rliqV) =
34 gamma < P(0) : LiqParams | CMin(cminV),





Listing 3.10: Maude definition of the operator replaceLiqParams, allowing to
modify the LP parameters. Extract from Listing A.7, Line 1793




3 --- assumes there is only one LiqParams object in gamma
4 op (_). params : Configuration -> [ Configuration ] .
5 eq (gamma ). params = $params (gamma) .
6 --- The auxiliary operator $params , returning the LiqParams






10 op (_). CMin : Configuration -> Float0 + .
11 eq (gamma ). CMin = (( gamma ). params ). CMin .
12
13 op (_). Rliq : Configuration -> Float0 + .





Listing 3.11: Maude definition of the operators used to access CMin and Rliq
values in a given configuration gamma. Extract from Listing A.7, Line 330
3.3.2 Validation of the LP specifications
The standard Maude command reduce is employed to unit-test the specifications. The
reduce command (abbreviated by red) reduces input terms into their corresponding
canonical form terms, by progressively applying equational simplification steps, as
detailed in Section 2.2.1. The deterministic behaviour of reduce makes it a suitable
command to test the specifications. In order to make the tests results immediately
verifiable, the test cases were designed so that they would always return a boolean
literal that equals to true if and only if the test case passes. Listing 3.12 shows an
example of a set of unit tests for a simple operator defined over agents’ wallets, their
semantics is indicated in the comments above each test.
--- If the token type of the added value is not in the map
--- -> a new entry is added
red in WALLET : (tau (0) |-> 1.0) + 5.0 : tau (1) ==
(( tau (0) |-> 1.0) ; (tau (1) |-> 5.0)) .
--- If the token type in map -> token amount is summed up
red in WALLET : (tau (0) |-> 1.0) + 5.0 : tau (0) ==
(tau (0) |-> 6.0) .
--- If the map comprises multiple entries -> sum the
--- the value of the right token type
red in WALLET : (( tau (0) |-> 1.0) ; (tau (1) |-> 1.0)) +
5.0 : tau (0) ==
(tau (0) |-> 6.0) ; (tau (1) |-> 1.0) .
Listing 3.12: Unit-test of the operator summing a Token to Float0+ with a
Token Float0+ pair, as defined in Listing A.4, Line 9.
Conversely, the more advanced search command is utilised to perform "integration-
tests" on the rewriting rules of the specifications. In fact, search is capable of
exploring the entire state space reachable by applying a finite number of rewriting
rules, as explained in Section 2.3.1. These test cases could not be designed so to
return boolean values, as they test properties on multiple configurations. Thus, they
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appear less immediate to verify than the aforementioned tests. However, they are
still very convenient to test interactions between the model components. Listing 3.13
illustrates an integration test for the rule modelling the heuristic which powers
rational liquidators, discussed in Section 4.
Totally, more than 350 tests have been developed in order to validate the specifi-
cation of the LP model. For brevity, tests have not been included in the Appendices.
However, they are available in the project repository [38].
--- This checks the number of all canonical final states ,
--- which is 7.
search in LIQUIDATOR -TEST :
( test12 ) =>! X: closedConfiguration .
--- Number of canonical final states satisfying the where
--- LED (0)’s collateralization is 0.0, then
--- expected = 7
search in LIQUIDATOR -TEST :
( test12 ) =>! X: closedConfiguration
such that
((X: closedConfiguration ). config ).C(LED (0)) == 0.0 .
Listing 3.13: Integration test of the liquidator agent behaviour, in scenario
when borrower collateralization is less than Rliq. The tested rule is defined in
Listing A.8, Line 395.
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4 An LP simulator for liquidating agents
This chapter lays the foundations for tackling the significant research problem of
finding optimal CMin and Rliq parameters for the lending pools model. This is
achieved by instantiating an LP simulator for conducting statistical analyses of the
model. The simulator comprises:
1. the LP Maude specification, defined in Section 3;
2. a heuristic for automating the behaviour of rational liquidators, defined in
Section 4.1;
3. a price model instantiated for simulating three different prices evolution scenar-
ios, for the three most widely employed cryptocurrencies, defined in Section 4.2;
Finally, the integration of the resulting LP simulator with MultiVeStA, is presented
in Section 4.3.
4.1 A fully-automated liquidating heuristic
This section explains a liquidating heuristic causing the LP protocol to possibly
reach unsafe states, where loans are not guaranteed to be repaid. Section 4.1.1
offers an intuitive understanding of aggressive liquidating behaviours. Subsequently,
Section 4.1.2 describes the proposed liquidating algorithm and Section 4.1.3 discusses
its implementation.
4.1.1 The impact of liquidations on collateralization
As observed in Section 2.1.3, liquidate actions involve two agents, namely a liquidator
and an undercollaterized borrower. Specifically, the liquidator is regarded to as an
agent holding sufficient liquidity to issue liquidate actions, whereas an undercolla-
terized borrower is an agent having its collateralization below CMin, the liquidation
threshold.
Practically, liquidators have a fundamental role in the LP financial safety, as they
are the actors supplying free tokens whenever the pool is lacking them. Although they
enable an essential mechanism for the LP safety56, excessively tenacious liquidators
could be harmful to the system. Specifically, these behaviours could disincentivize
the liquidated agents (i.e. the undercollaterized borrowers57) to ultimately repay their
loans. This is better understood by observing Figure 4.1, where all the liquidating
scenarios are outlined. The figure illustrates the agents’ collateralization58, detailing
the outcomes of liquidate actions in every possible (non-trivial) configuration. The
scenarios are also well captured by the running example in Figure 2.2, used to
illustrate the liquidate action.
56Together with interest rates.
57Henceforth simply borrowers.
58Defined in Section 2.1.3.
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Figure 4.1: The three possible liquidation scenarios
Firstly, the three dashed lines in the figure correspond to the liquidation parame-
ters specific to the instantiated pool. Their labels represent the respective line slopes.
Specifically, Cmin and rliq were discussed in Section 3.3.1, whereas the line labelled
1 depicts the scenarios where the collateral value equals the loan value59. Conse-
quently, it can be intended as the loan repayment incentivizing threshold, i.e. the
collateralization value below which agents should be considered to be disincentivized
in repaying their loans. These residual loans are also called non-recoverable.
Additionally, the three points indicate the initial collateralization of three liqui-
dated borrowers. Each liquidation action60 is illustrated by a solid line drawn from
CΓ(I ) to CΓ′(I ) for I ∈ {A,B,C}. Liquidations entail a decrease in the liquidated
user’s collateralization by a linear factor proportional to rliq and ultimately deter-
mined by the liquidator. It should be noted that the liquidation actions described in
the figure follow the exact semantics of the liquidate as defined in Listing 3.9, as the
resulting loan value must be greater than zero61 and the final collateralization must
be at most Cmin62.
Lastly, it is worth observing that the liquidations in the figure can be achieved
by applying only one action if and only if two conditions hold. Firstly, the liquidator
invests enough liquidity to seize the entire seizable collateral. Secondly, the liquidated
borrower does not diversify the type of the loan. If either the first condition or the
second does not hold, then the liquidations illustrated in the figure can be achieved
uniquely by performing several liquidate actions on the borrower. This is frequently
the case in the major LP implementations: Compound and Aave. In fact, these
59Given a borrower B, collateral value and loan values are defined in Section 2.1.3 as V mΓ (B) and
V lΓ(B), respectively.
60Or a few of them.
61From condition (pi).loan[B0][tau] >= v
62From condition (gamma’).C(B0) <= CMin
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prevent the whole seizable collateral amount to be atomically liquidated, by setting
Maxliq which is respectively variable in Compound [42] and constant (equals to 0.5)
in Aave [13]. In order to faithfully reproduce the real platforms behaviour, this model
employs the parameter Maxliq, discussed in Section 2.1.3.
4.1.2 The proposed liquidating heuristic
As it is evident from Figure 4.1, the borrower’s collateralization is re-established
for agent A, whereas liquidations cause B and C to lose their entire collateral,
disincentivizing them from repaying the loans. In light of this fact, it is sensible to
pose as a research question whether there exist an optimal pair (Cmin, rliq) s.t. the
number of non-recoverable loans is minimal. In order to answer this question, the
current section proposes a heuristic attempting to reproduce a rational behaviour for
liquidators. The employed heuristic simulate a rational behaviour where liquidators
repay the entire borrowers’ collateral. This behaviour can be defined as rational for
the two contradictory reasons given below.
1. Fast liquidations have the undoubted advantage of restoring liquidity, although
this generates non-recoverable loans (as for agents B and C in Figure 4.1).
2. However, fast liquidations are non-desirable whenever the borrowers have
collateralization slightly below rliq. In fact, in these cases a minimal price
fluctuation could raise their collateralization to rliq allowing the liquidators to
effectively restore the agents’ collateralization to Cmin.
More formally, the algorithm utilised to implement the liquidator behaviour
selects the liquidate input parameters, so to maximise the value of seized collateral.
Specifically, given a liquidator L, the algorithm computes the remaining four liquidate
parameters: the borrower’s agent identifier (Br), the amount of loan to be repaid
(vr), the type of the asset to be repaid (τ̂ r) and the one of the asset to be seized (τ ′r).
The algorithm operates by first computing all valid combinations of parameters and
storing them in a list. Subsequently, three procedures are applied; these modify the
list and lastly extract the final solution. Algorithm 1 details the heuristic, explained
in the rest of this section.
As the algorithm illustrates, for each undercollaterized borrower B0 , valid liquidate
parameters are chosen as following.
Line 3 - The loan asset types τ̂ are computed as the intersection of the liquidator’s and
B0 ’s asset types.
Line 4 - The amount of seizable collateral and its asset type is calculated as all the
pairs (v′, τ ′) such that B0 owns v′ units of a minted token τ ′.
Line 5 - The current liquidate parameters, ((B0 , v′), (τ̂ , τ ′)), is added to a list l, which
is subsequently modified by two function calls.
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Algorithm 1 Liquidator heuristic algorithm
1: procedure Liquidator(L)
2: l← emptyList()
3: forall τ̂ ∈ dom(σ(L)) ∩ ⋃︁B0 | CΓ(B0 )<Cmin dom(πl(B0 )):
4: forall (v′, τ ′) ∈ ⋃︁B0 | CΓ(B0 )<Cmin{filterMinted((cod(σ(B0 )), dom(σ(B0 ))))}:




9: ((Br , vr), (τ̂ r, τ ′r))← seized2Repaid(elem)
10: return ((Br , vr), (τ̂ r, τ ′r))
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Line 6 - The updateRepaidUpToCMin function modifies an element in the list, ((B0 , v′), (τ̂ , τ ′)),
if and only if CΓ(B0 ) ∈ [rliq, Cmin). Graphically, this situation is illustrated by
CΓ(A) in Figure 4.1. Accordingly to that figure, updateRepaidUpToCMin re-
places v′ with a value such that B0 ’s collateralization in the next configuration,
Γ′, is CΓ′(B0 ) ≤ 1.5.
Line 7 - The filterRepayable operator removes from l the elements ((B0 , v′), (τ̂ , τ ′))
s.t. v′ : τ is higher than the amount L is capable to repay.
Line 8 - The getMaxMinted function finds the element elem = ((B0 , v′m), (τ̂ r, τ ′m)),
s.t. the value of v′ : τ ′ is the maximum. In other words, this function call
maximises the amount of seized collateral.
Line 9 - The seized2Repaid function converts the amount of seizable collateral ((v′m :
τ ′m)) into the amount of repayable loan ((vr : τr)).
It should be noted that this algorithm selects the entire amount of the borrower’s
repayable loan in a given asset type. In order to limit this amount by the Maxliq
factor, the way the algorithm has been implemented is slightly more complex. This
is explained in Section 4.1.3.
In conclusion, plausibly assuming that the amount of assets types in an agent
wallet is constant, it can be observed that the cost of Algorithm 1 is linear in the
number of undercollaterized borrowers. This comes as a simple consequence of the
fact that firstly Lines 3 and 4 could easily be translated into two separate looping
constructs, secondly the function calls in Lines 6 to 8 are linear in the length of l.
4.1.3 Heuristic implementation
The LP specifications implement Algorithm 1 as shown in Listing 4.1.
1 eq (gamma ). selectLIQParams (L, aSet , maxRep %) =
2 (( gamma ).lp). seized2Repaid (
3 findMax4TV ^m(
4 (gamma ). filterRepayable ( maxRep %, L,
5 (gamma ). updateRepaidUpToCMin (
6 combine (
7 (gamma ). getAFLTPairs ( aSet , L ),
8 (gamma ). getAMWTPairs ( aSet )
9 ) ) )
10 ), (gamma ). Rliq ) .
Listing 4.1: Maude definition of the logic for liquidate parameters selection,
extract from Listing A.8, Line 328
As mentioned in the previous section, the possible combinations of parameters
are generated by splitting their generation routine in two different function calls
(getAFLTPairs and getAMWTPairs), whose output is then aggregated by combine.
Apart from maxRep%, the remaining part of the listing resembles the algorithm, hence
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it is not discussed. The input parameter maxRep% is a float number modelling L’s
liquidating speed, ergo the maximum percentage of seizable collateral. As per the
current development, this value cannot exceed Maxliq63, set by default to 0.564.
The algorithm implementation was simplified by the development of higher-order
functions in Maude, inspired by [22]. A wide range of operators were defined by
making use of the expressive power of higher order functions, including map and
filter. Listing 4.2 shows the implementation of filter.
1 fmod AP{X :: TRIV , Y :: TRIV} is
2 sort Func{X, Y} .
3 op _[_] : Func{X, Y} X$Elt -> Y$Elt [prec 17] .
4 endfm
5
6 fmod HO1{X :: TRIV} is
7 inc LIST{X} .
8 endfm
9
10 fmod HO - FILTER {X :: TRIV} is
11 including HO1{X} .
12 protecting BOOL .
13 inc AP{X, Bool} .
14
15 var E : X$Elt .
16 var L : List{X} .
17 var P : Func{X, Bool} . --- predicate
18
19 op filter : List{X} Func{X, Bool} -> List{X} .
20 eq filter (nil , P) = nil .
21 ceq filter (E | L, P) = E | filter (L, P)
22 if P[E] . --- if predicate holds for E then add E to L
23 --- otherwise E is not added
24 eq filter (E | L, P) = filter (L, P) [owise] .
25 endfm
Listing 4.2: Maude definition of the filter higher order function, extract from
Listing A.2, Line 335
As the listing shows, filter takes two input parameters: a term L of sort List{X}
and a term P of sort Func{X, Bool}, also called a predicate. The operator returns
a list containing the L’s elements which are satisfying P. Listing 4.3 illustrates
the filter usage, by displaying the implementation of filterRepayable, whose
behaviour was described in the previous section.
63This is shown in Listing A.7, Line 162.
64This is shown in Listing A.7, Line 141.
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1 eq (gamma ). filterRepayable ( maxRep %, LOR , aFFMList ) =
2 filter (aFFMList ,
3 (gamma ). isLoanRepayable ( maxRep %, LOR )) .
Listing 4.3: Example of the Maude filter higher order function, extract from
Listing A.8, Line 194
The filterRepayable operator utilises the predicate isLoanRepayable65 for
filtering the aFFMList list composed by the liquidate parameters candidates.
4.2 Prices modelling
This section describes the price model employed to predict cryptocurrencies prices,
based on historical data. Section 4.2.1 overviews the price model and motivates its
adoption. Afterwards, Section 4.2.2 presents the three model instantiation scenarios
used in the subsequent statistical analysis.
4.2.1 Predicting cryptocurrency prices
The cryptoassets prices are derived from a statistical model representative of the past
price behaviour: the Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) introduced in Section 2.4.1.
A GBM is instantiated by two parameters drift and volatility which can be estimated
from the currency historical data. This makes the Geometric Brownian Motion the
ideal stochastic process for modelling stock prices based on their past evolution [21].
Aiming at stress-testing the LP protocol and inspired by [26], three different
scenarios are designed, each comprising a pair of price trends. In practice, each
scenario simulates the evolution of prices of a given collateral and loan assets, in a
way that respectively when the former declines, the latter increases. In fact assuming
that each borrower B0 owes a loan in only one asset type τl66 and similarly holds
collateral of only one asset type τm67, such a model for prices necessarily causes some
borrowers to become undercollaterized, as shown in (4.1).
CΓ(B0 ) =
V mΓ (B0 )
V lΓ(B0 )
p(τm)→0 p(τl)→V−−−−−−−−−−→ 0,with V ≫ 0 (4.1)
More precisely, prices modelling is achieved by opportunely gathering the data
used to estimate the parameters (drift and volatility) for generating a growing, de-
creasing or relatively constant Geometric Brownian Motion process. In the literature,
daily closing prices of stock markets are utilised, given the fact that their samples
generally tend to be normal, which allows to employ the GBM generic formula in
Section 2.4.1. Ultimately, since prices’ predictions pairs should variate in a way that
they simultaneously display an opposite behaviour, it is necessary to correlate them,
as shown in [31].
65Defined in Listing A.8, Line 179.
66Also called a loan asset.
67Also called a collateral asset.
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4.2.2 Prices model instantiation
Given a collateral asset τm and a loan asset τl, the three prices evolution pairs are
shown in Table 4.1.
Scenario τm τl p(τm) p(τl)
eth-wbtc ETH WBTC Declining Increasing
eth-usdc ETH USDC Declining Constant
usdc-wbtc USDC WBTC Constant Increasing
Table 4.1: The three implemented prices evolution scenarios
The choice of the cryptocurrencies in the table68 is motivated by their closing
price historical evolution in three different trimesters, shown in Figure 4.2. By using
those samples, it is possible to simulate the desired trends indicated in the columns
named p(τm) and p(τl). This is achieved by estimating the expected price returns (µ)
and the price volatility (σ), which are utilised as the drift and volatility instantiating
the resulting GBM. The two parameters are estimated according to [31]. The drift
µ is simply obtained by computing the mean over the closing prices69. Contrarily, σ
is calculated accordingly to (4.2)70, where s indicates the standard deviation of the
log returns and
√
T is the annualisation constant.
σ = s√
T
, with T = 91365 (4.2)
It should be noted that the selected sampling time span (91 days, i.e. a trimester)
is motivated by the fact that cryptoassets are subject to sudden fluctuations and,
even though short samples might not be representative of the entire population, this
is a consolidated practice [31]. Besides, the resulting price predictions span over the
same time frames, as each price model instantiation produces 91 prices predictions,
as illustrated in Section 4.3.4. Noteworthily, the selected cryptocurrencies (ETH,
USDC and WBTC) were among the four-most-utilised assets on the Compound
market [20] at the moment of writing. Lastly, the selected closing price samples are
suitable, since the derived log returns distributions tend to be normal (Figure B1).
Table 4.2 shows an estimation of the GBM parameters obtained from the close
prices in Figure 4.2, by the previously discussed methodology. The parameters
are then utilised to instantiate the six GBM processes (each for price evolution),
simulating the scenarios in Table 4.1. Finally, the asset initial price P0 is a constant
set to the actual price in USD of each asset on May 5th, 202171.
68Ethereum (ETH), USD Coins (USDC) and Wrapped Bitcoins (WBTC).
69Section 15.3 of [31].
70Section 15.4 of [31].





Figure 4.2: Trimester closing prices, collected from CoinGecko APIs
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Cryptocurrency µ σ P0 (usd)
ETH -0.01207 0.1278 3269.08
USDC -7.8411E-5 0.0056 0.999319
WBTC 0.01269 0.0947 57260.0
Table 4.2: Geometric Brownian Motion parameters used for the three price model
instantiation scenarios
Figure 4.3: High-level view of a MultiVeStA trace, generated by the LP Maude
simulator
4.3 LP model integration with MultiVeStA
This chapter discusses the interaction between the LP simulator and MultiVeStA.
First, Section 4.3.1 offers a synopsis of a MultiVeStA simulation invoking the LP
simulator. Second, Section 4.3.2 explains how the features discussed in Sections 4.1
and 4.2 are required by the integration. Third, Section 4.3.3 utilises the notions intro-
duced in Section 4.3.2, in order to offer a more detailed description of the MultiVeStA
simulations. Finally, Section 4.3.4 illustrates an example of MultiVeStA analysis,
useful to verify the correctness of the price models instantiated in Section 4.2.2.
4.3.1 Simulating LP in MultiVeStA: overview
As introduced in Section 2.3.3, a MultiVeStA simulation can be viewed as an execution
trace in the underlying transition system, having NewState objects as nodes. An
LPState is a Java class extending the MultiVeStA NewState class. Precisely, the
LPState can be thought as a wrapper of the model which MultiVeStA is supposed to
analyse. An equivalent way of viewing LPState is as the interface used by MultiVeStA
to interact with the model. Consequently, a NewState might be the result of few
states and transitions of the underlying model. This is the case for the LPState,
which this subsection only aims at giving an overview of.
In the case of the LP model, a MultiVeStA simulation resembles the graph in
Figure 4.3. Here the dashed arrows show the next possible states, whereas the solid
ones indicate the next-traversed state in the current simulation.
In the figure, a step of a MultiVeStA simulation leads to an insertion of a new
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liquidate message in the current LP configuration. These messages are automatically
generated by a specific type of agents (so called liquidators). Additionally, each
simulation step provokes a change of price for both the collateral and loan assets.
The implementation of both these changes to the underlying LP configuration are
detailed in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.2 Liquidators and prices predictions in Maude
The operator selectLIQParams in Listing 4.1 is used by a liquidator for issuing a
liquidate. Liquidators behaviour is implemented by the Maude rule in Listing 4.4.
1 --- Note: LOR -> liquidating agent identifier
2 --- LED -> liquidated agent identifier
3 crl [issue - liquidate ] :
4 [ gamma
5 < LOR : LIQ -Speed(s) | * sigma > ]
6 --- filterMsgOut removes all previous liquidate actions
7 --- issued by LOR over LED
8 => [ filterMsgOut ( gamma , (LIQ , (LOR , LED )) )
9 < LOR : LIQ -Speed(s) | * sigma >
10 liquidate (LOR , LED , (v, hTau), tau ’)
11 ]
12 if ([ gamma ]). isRewritten /\ --- this ensures that 2
13 --- liquidates can ’t be
14 --- issued
15 LED - candidates :=
16 ( getUndercoll (gamma) \ getCollNegligible (gamma )) /\
17 ((LED , vTmp), (hTau : tau ’)) :=
18 ( gamma
19 < LOR : LIQ -Speed(s) | * sigma >
20 ). selectLIQParams (LOR , LED -candidates , s) /\
21 ((LED , vTmp), (hTau : tau ’)) =/= dummyMax4Tuple /\
22 LOR =/= LED /\ --- agent can ’t liquidate itself
23
24 --- Note: v:=... allows to liquidate everything
25 --- in case vTmp * its price is below a
26 --- threshold , owise computation would not
27 --- converge
28 v := ((( vTmp * (( gamma ).lp). price[hTau ]) < s) ?
29 vTmp : (vTmp * s) ) .
Listing 4.4: Maude definition of the logic for issuing a liquidate, modified extract
from Listing A.8, Line 395. The only modification to the appendix is the
renaming of tau in hTau. This is to align the notation with Figure 2.1.
Notably, an agent, having CId equals LIQ-Speed(s), where s is a term of
sort Float0+, is an agent regarded to as a liquidator. Given a liquidator, the
issue-liquidate rule has the only effect of inserting a new liquidate to the current
configuration. The insertion only occurs if the inserted liquidate was the only one in
the configuration. This is guaranteed by [gamma].isRewritten, which ensures that
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Figure 4.4: Fully-detailed representation of the MultiVeStA simulation in Figure 4.3.
This is an example of simulation of an LP model having 3 liquidators.
no other message belongs to the configuration. If that is the case, the rule computes
the next liquidate input parameters by invoking the selectLIQParams operator72
and it issues a liquidate message.
Secondly, the prices predictions computed via the Geometric Brownian Motion
introduced in Section 4.2 are integrated in the LP configuration by the operator
updatePrice. As Listing 4.5 illustrates, the operator simply updates the old prices
with the new ones, computed by a procedure external to the Maude model.
1 --- MultiVeStA - new price injection
2 op updatePrice (_,_) : Map{Token , Float0 +}
3 closedConfiguration
4 -> closedConfiguration .
5 eq updatePrice (newP , [(pi | oldP) gamma ]) =
6 [(pi | newP) gamma] .
Listing 4.5: Maude definition of the logic for updating the LP assets prices,
extract from Listing A.7, Line 1777
4.3.3 LPState: the LP-MultiVeStA interface
The Maude functionalities discussed in the previous section, issue-liquidate
and updatePrice, are directly utilised by MultiVeStA simulations, as visualised in
Figure 4.4.
The graph illustrates that at each step of a simulation, liquidators initiate a race
condition to have their liquidate message added to the next LPState. As result of
this race condition, where all liquidators try executing the issue-liquidate rule,
72The subsequent condition where v is assigned to vTmp * s, ensures that the liquidator repays a
loan based on its liquidation speed. This does not occur, only if the value of the repayable amount
is almost negligible. In that case, the liquidator is allowed to repay the whole repayable amount.
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only one among them manages to publish the liquidate. It should be noted that
the liquidate is selected according to a uniform distribution, as shown in the figure.
Subsequently, the next LPState consists of the previous state with the newly added
liquidate. At this stage, first the liquidate is rewritten, as indicated by the edge
labelled liquidate and second the newly sampled prices predictions for the loan
and collateral assets are injected in the LP configuration. The simulation continues
following this scheme until liquidators can issue liquidate messages, i.e. until the
set of undercollaterized agents in the LP configuration becomes empty.
It is worth noting that at each step, only one liquidator can issue a liquidate.
This is guaranteed by the first condition of the rule issue-liquidate in Listing 4.4.
Lastly, it is now straightforward to observe that Figure 4.4 is a simulation having
three competing liquidators.
4.3.4 Expected prices predictions
As mentioned in Section 2.3.3, MultiVeStA-executable analyses are defined by prop-
erties expressed in MultiQuaTEx. MultiVeStA can be employed to observe the
behaviour of each component of an LPState. For instance, this subsection uses
MultiVeStA to examine the prices predictions generated by the geometric Brown-
ian motion in each of the scenarios explained in Section 4.2.2. Listing 4.6 is the
MultiQuaTEx property querying the LP model for the mean of the step-wise asset
collateral value, over 91 consecutive observations.
1 obsAtStep ( i , x ) =
2 if ( s . rval (”steps”) == x )
3 then s . rval ( i )
4 else # obsAtStep ( i , x )
5 fi ;
6 eval parametric ( E [ obsAtStep (”CUR_COLLATERAL_PRICE” , x ) ] ,
7 x , 1 , 1 , 91 ) ;
Listing 4.6: meanCollateralPrice.multiquatex - MultiQuaTEx property pro-
ducing the mean collateral asset price evolution.
The main idea of this property is that at each step of a simulation, MultiVeStA
questions the current LPState about the new value of the collateral asset price, sam-
pled by a geometric Brownian motion. Subsequently, for each liquidation round the
mean of the step-wise observations is computed and returned. This is the semantics
expressed by the E[obsAtStep(...)] input argument to eval parametric. The remain-
ing arguments to eval parametric repeat the same procedure (E[obsAtStep(...)])
for 91 liquidation rounds73. A similar property has also been developed for querying
the mean loan asset price evolution, for 91 liquidation rounds.
Figure 4.5 shows the normalised trend of the price scenarios, discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2.2. The figures show that the expected behaviour, expressed in Table 4.1 is
73The number 91 is motivated by the historical time spans considered to instantiate the geometric
Brownian motion processes, discussed in Section 4.2.2.
63
obtained in all the considered scenarios. Additionally, in Figures 4.5a and 4.5c prices
predictions are strongly correlated as it is expected. In fact, the GBMs pairs were
instantiated as negatively correlated processes74 accordingly to [31], Section 14.5.
Contrarily, Figure 4.5b shows less correlated prices predictions. This is probably due
to the fact that the computation was bounded to execute maximum 5010 simulations.
In fact, from experimental evidence, the approximation seem to converge at a very
slow speed75.
Finally, Figures B2 and B3 illustrate the unnormalised behaviour of the considered
GBM prediction scenarios, w.r.t. the collateral and loan assets respectively.
74With ρ = 1, where ρ is the Pearson correlation coefficient.





Figure 4.5: Prices predictions produced, for each scenario in Table 4.1, by GBMs
instantiated with the parameters in Table 4.2.
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5 The formal verification tool
This chapter shows the functionalities of the developed verification tool for the lending
pools model, as described in Sections 3 and 4.
Specifically, Section 5.1 discusses the most basic usage of the tool i.e. simulation of
LP model executions. Subsequently, Section 5.2 introduces more advanced analyses
such as invariant properties verification via reachability analysis and LTL model
checking. Finally, Section 5.3 explains an example of MultiVeStA statistical analysis
conducted on the LP simulator, developed in Section 4.3.
5.1 LP model simulation
The specifications introduced in Section 3 allow to simulate the lending pools model
with a high level of fidelity and in an automated manner. This section explains
possible applications offered by the Maude specification.
First, Section 5.1.1 compares an LP execution given by [7] with one produced by
the Maude specification of LP. This is a basic but essential functionality of the tool,
confirming or denying the correctness of an LP execution or allowing the verifier to
explore its complete state space.
Second, Section 5.1.2 illustrates an example of a price oracle attack, as presented
in [7]. In this case, the Maude specification represents a direct and simple means to
verify the plausibility of an attack.
5.1.1 Executable specifications
The Maude specification can emulate the behaviour of the LP model in Section 2.1.3.
For instance, Listing 5.1 defines Gamma^i0, representing the initial configuration Γi0
of the running example in Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3. In fact, each state resulting
from a rewrite on term Gamma^i0 resembles a row in Figure 2.2.
op Gamma^i0 : -> closedConfiguration .
eq Gamma^i0 = [({
fund: tau (0) |-> 3.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.95e+2,
loan: A |-> tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
B |-> tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
C |-> tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’,3.0e+2) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’,5.0e+2)
} |
tau (0) |-> 1.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.0 )
< A : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< B : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (0) ’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
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< C : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< D : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 5.0e+2 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 5.0e+2) >
< C(0) : Coll | * (A ,1.25) ,
* (B ,1.0) ,
* (C ,8.0000000000000004e-1),
* (D,-) >
< R(0) : Round | none >
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1) >
liquidate (D, A, (50.0 , tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)
liquidate (D, B, (90.90909090909090 , tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)
liquidate (D, C, (90.90909090909090 , tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)
] .
Listing 5.1: Initial configuration Γi0 in Figure 2.2 expressed in Maude.
To exemplify the usage of the Maude simulator, the state space of Γi0 is now
explored via the search command. The execution of search on Gamma^i0 resulting
from zero or more rewriting steps (=>*) generates the terms in Listing 5.2. The
states 0 and 7 represent the configurations Γi0 and Γ3,1 in Figure 2.2, respectively.
The full Maude representation of the running example (Figure 2.2 and table 2.3) is
given in Listing C.1.
search in SEARCH - EXAMPLE :
Gamma^i0 =>* X: closedConfiguration .
Solution 1 (state 0) –- Γi0, in Table 2.3
states : 1 rewrites : 147 in 0ms cpu (0ms real)
(~ rewrites / second )
X: closedConfiguration --> [(
{
fund: tau (0) |-> 3.0e+2 ; tau (1) |-> 1.95e+2,
loan: A |-> tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
B |-> tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
C |-> tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’ ,3.0e+2) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’ ,5.0e+2)
}
|
tau (0) |-> 1.0 ; tau (1) |-> 1.0
)
< A : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< B : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< C : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2 ;
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tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< D : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 5.0e+2 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 5.0e+2) >
< C(0) : Coll | * (A ,1.25) ,
* (B ,1.0) ,
* (C ,0.8) ,
* (D,-) >
< R(0) : Round | none >
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1000000000000001) >
liquidate (D, A, (5.0e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)
liquidate (D, B, (9.0909090909090907 e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)




Solution 8 (state 7) –- Γ3,1, in Table 2.3
states : 8 rewrites : 9701 in 9ms cpu (10 ms real)
(974093 rewrites / second )
X: closedConfiguration --> [(
{
fund: tau (0) |-> 3.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 4.2681818181818176 e+2,
loan: A |-> tau (1) |-> 3.0e+1 ;
B |-> tau (1) |-> 9.0909090909090935 ;
C |-> tau (1) |->
3.4090909090909093 e+1,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’ ,3.0e+2) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’ ,5.0e+2)
}
|
tau (0) |-> 1.0 ; tau (1) |-> 1.0
)
< A : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 4.4999999999999993 e+1) >
< B : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 0.0) >
< C : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 0.0) >
< D : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 2.6818181818181824 e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 2.55e+2 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 5.0e+2) >
< C(3) : Coll | * (A ,1.5) ,
* (B ,0.0) ,
* (C ,0.0) ,
* (D,-) >
< R(3) : Round | none >
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1) >]
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No more solutions .
states : 8 rewrites : 10827 in 9ms cpu (11 ms real)
(1087157 rewrites / second )
Listing 5.2: Results produced by a search simulating the traces in the transition
system of Figure 2.2. Extract from Listing C.1
5.1.2 Price oracle attack
The specifications developed in Section 3 can be employed to reproduce or possibly
investigate on (novel) attacks compromising the LP safety. A simple Maude rewrite
command, explained in Section 2.2.2, is sufficient to observe the attacks effect.
Listing 5.3 describes the initial configuration for simulating the price oracle attack
proposed in Section 5.1 of [7]. The initial attack assumption is that the attacker, the
agent Att, is empowered to change token prices. As a consequence, Att causes a
sudden decline in the price of tau(0) tokens, used by the victim Vic as its collateral.
The sudden price drop entails Vic’s collateralization to fall below Rliq76, allowing
Att to liquidate77 Vic.
Listing 5.4 depicts the results of the attack on the initial configuration. The
resulting configuration is obtained by simply executing a rewrite [2] on the con-
figuration CSAttack2A in Listing 5.3, which consumes the two Messages price and
liquidate, in this order. As it is illustrated in the listing, Att is capable of seizing
the entire Vic’s collateral (1500 units of tau(0)), by not even repaying a unit of
tau(1) B’s debt.




fund: tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.5e+3,
loan: Vic |-> tau (0) |-> 1.0e+3,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’,1.0e+3) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’,1.5e+3)
}
|
tau (0) |-> 1.0 ; tau (1) |-> 1.0
)
< Att : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+3) >
< Vic : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+3 ;
tau (1) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 1.5e+3) >
< R(4) : Round | none >
76This is a consequence of the definition of collateralization (2.8), also shown by CΓ(C) in
Figure 4.1.
77For simplicity, in Listing 5.3 Maxliq is assumed to be equal to 1.0, permitting Att to seize the
entire Vic’s collateral. This is not the case in the LP implementations as described in Sections 2.1.3
and 4.1.1.
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< C(4) : Coll | * (Att ,-),* (Vic ,1.5) ,* (C,-) >
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1) >
price(tau (1) |-> 1.0e -24)
liquidate (Att , Vic , ( ((1499.0 * 1.0e -24) / 1.1) ,
tau (0) ), tau (1) ’)
]
Listing 5.3: Initial configuration for simulating a price oracle attack, according
to [7], Section 5.1.
rewrite [2] in ATTACKS : CSAttack2A .
rewrites : 381 in 3ms cpu (0ms real) (114311 rewrites / second )
[ (
{
fund: tau (0) |-> 1.3627272727272726e -21 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.5e+3,
loan: Vic |-> tau (0) |-> 1.0e+3,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’,1.0e+3) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’,1.5e+3)
}
|
tau (0) |-> 1.0 ;
--- Collateral price set to 0, by the price update
tau (1) |-> 9.9999999999999992e -25
)
--- The attacker successfully liquidates all Vic ’s
--- collateral by not repaying its loan
< Att : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+3 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 1.4990000000000002 e+3) >
< Vic : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+3 ;
tau (1) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 9.9999999999977263e -1) >
--- Vic collateralization drops to 0, after the
--- collateral price is set to 0
< C(6) : Coll | * (Att ,-),* (Vic ,9.999999999997726e -28) >
< R(6) : Round | none >
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1000000000000001) >
]
Listing 5.4: Final state of a price oracle attack simulation.
5.2 Model Checking invariants
This section illustrates two verification techniques in order to check whether given
invariants hold in the LP model. Section 5.2.1 presents an example of reachability
analysis for verifying that an invariant holds in a given initial state. Similarly,
Section 5.2.2 illustrates the verification of the same invariant property expressed via
a simple LTL formula.
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5.2.1 Reachability analysis
The rich Maude environment offers support for proving safety properties of a model
specified in Maude. This point is illustrated by conducting a simple reachability
analysis on the finite state space originated from Gamma^i0 configuration78, defined
in Listing 5.1. Similarly to the examples given in Section 5.1, this is a very simple
application which could be employed for proving more complex and less obvious
properties.
The analysis discussed here has been developed by integrating the Maude
MODEL-CHECKER module, part of the native Maude library, model-checker.maude.
Consequently, some basic notions on the integration of this specification with that
module should be given. In Maude, the essential operator utilised to express a
property (or proposition) holding in a model state is op _|=_ : State Prop ->
Bool. This operator is the main service exposed by the MODEL-CHECKER module. In
order to use it, three actions are required:
• defining the specified model configuration as a subsort of State;
• defining an operator returning a term of sort Prop;
• defining the operator _|=_ semantics.
Listing 5.5 depicts how these actions are taken in the LP specification. Thus,
from this point, any term of sort closedConfiguration is regarded to as a State
term and lemma1 term is of sort Prop. As a result, the term gamma |= lemma1,
with gamma a closedConfiguration, is a well-defined term. In fact, the equation in
Line 7 allows to reduce gamma |= lemma1 to testLemma1(gamma), i.e. the operator
returning true iff gamma satisfies lemma179.
1 var obj : Object .
2 var msg : Msg .
3 var bal : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
4 var agState : Agent -State .
5
6 op testLemma1 : closedConfiguration -> Bool .
7 eq testLemma1 (gamma) =
8 $testLemma1 (( gamma ). config ,
9 (( gamma ). config ). mintedTokens ) .
10
11 var mTokenSet : Set{Minted -Token} .
12 var tau ’ : Minted -Token .
13
14 --- pre: 1. Set{Minted -Token} is ( config ). mintedTokens
15 --- 2. minted token tau is tau ’
16 op $testLemma1 : Configuration Set{Token} -> Bool .
17 eq $testLemma1 (config , empty) = true .
18 eq $testLemma1 (config , tau ’) =
78This configuration implies a state space comprising 7 other configurations.
79Defined in Listing A.9, Line 142.
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19 ( config ). balSum (tau ’) ==
20 snd (( config ).pi.m[( config ).u(tau ’)]) .
21 eq $testLemma1 (config , (mTokenSet , tau ’)) =
22 if (( config ). balSum (tau ’) ==
23 snd (( config ).pi.m[( config ).u(tau ’)])) then







29 subsort closedConfiguration < State .
30 op lemma1 : -> Prop .
31
32 --- Given gamma a variable of sort closedConfiguration
33 eq gamma |= lemma1 = testLemma1 (gamma) .
Listing 5.5: Statements required to integrate LP specification with the
MODEL-CHECKER native Maude module. Extract from Listing A.9, Lines 14
and 142.
Having established this, Listing 5.6 illustrates an example where the state property
of Lemma 1 in [7]80 lemma1 is shown to hold for any configuration reachable from
Gamma^i081.
search in SEARCH - EXAMPLE : Gamma^i0 =>* C: closedConfiguration
such that not C: closedConfiguration |= lemma1 = true .
Listing 5.6: Example of search used to verify a safety property.
In fact, Listing 5.7 shows that no reachable configuration satisfies not lemma1.
This signifies that the negation of lemma1 does not hold in any reachable state or,
equivalently, lemma1 holds in all the states reachable from Gamma^i0.
No solution .
states : 8 rewrites : 7080 in 6ms cpu (7ms real)
(1071266 rewrites / second )
Listing 5.7: Output returned by the search command in Listing 5.6.
5.2.2 LTL model checking
The Maude MODEL-CHECKER module also defines the Linear Temporal Logic constructs.
As a result the command in Listing 5.6 can be expressed by a simpler Maude command
containing an LTL formula. Additionally, the Maude LTL model checker provides
more efficient procedures to check properties satisfiability [23].
80This lemma was proven by Bartoletti et al. , hence the above example is purely illustrative.
81Defined in Listing 5.1.
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Listing 5.8 illustrates an alternative command to check that the state formula
underlying lemma1 holds in all reachable states of Gamma^i0. In Line 1 of the
listing, the checked LTL formula is [] lemma1. The property, checked in the initial
configuration Gamma^i0, is to be interpret as lemma1 holds in any path originating
in Gamma^i0. Therefore, the [] operator is the Maude implementation of the □
temporal operator, as defined in Section 2.3.2.
1 reduce in SEARCH - EXAMPLE : modelCheck (Gamma^i0 , [] lemma1 ) .
2 rewrites : 12766 in 16ms cpu (15 ms real)
3 (770428 rewrites / second )
4 result Bool: true
Listing 5.8: Example of LTL formula used to verify a safety property.
Finally, it should be noted that any formula expressible in LTL, not just invariants,
may be checked of the model as long as the state space derived from the chosen
initial configuration is finite [19], Chapter 12.
5.3 Statistical analyses
Figure 5.1: Distribution of the borrowers’ collateralization in the initial configurations.
This section describes the experiments conducted on the LP model simulator,
described in Section 4, in order to answer the question: given some "undesirable"
scenarios, what is the "optimal" pair of LP parameters Cmin and rliq? However, to
elaborate on the results, it is appropriate to summarise the assumptions which have
been set so far. A convenient summary can be offered by a better definition for the
two adjectives "undesirable" and "optimal":
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"undesirable" - in this study such scenarios are generated by four factors. First, the liquidator
logic defined in Section 4.1, determines immediate and quick82 liquidations,
causing a significant financial loss to the liquidated party. Secondly, the agent
to be liquidated is selected so to maximise the value of seized collateral, which
is the most beneficial and rational option for liquidators. Thirdly, liquidators
are assumed to hold an infinite amount of resources, which allows them to
repeat liquidations as long as there exists an undercollaterized agent. Finally,
cryptoasset prices evolve following a trend aimed at causing borrowers to
suddenly become undercollaterized.
"optimal" - the pair Cmin and rliq is optimal if it minimises the number of undercollaterized
borrowers. This pair is estimated by executing MultiVeStA experiments for
all Cmin ranging, with step 0.1, from 1.2 to 1.5 and rliq ranging from 1.1 to
Cmin − 0.1. These ranges were selected based on the values assigned to these
parameters in the real implementation: Cmin = 1.5 and rliq = 1.1 [7].
On these premises, Section 5.3.1 illustrates the LP model initial configurations
used for the subsequent experimentation. Next, Section 5.3.2 will present the results
of the performed experiments.
5.3.1 Initial configurations for experiments
The initial configuration were designed so to test the resistance of different borrowers’
collateralization to becoming unrecoverable, when subject to repeated liquidations.
Since the intention is to observe the model behaviour under three price models
(Section 4.2.2), three different initial configurations are produced, each having a
different price for collateral and loan assets. Nevertheless all the configurations share
the same amount and types of agents. Specifically, a generic initial configuration
comprises ten borrowers having collateralization ranging from 1.0 to 2.0, with step
0.1. This is depicted in Figure 5.1, where bi represents the generic borrower Bi ’s
collateralization (CΓi(Bi)), for Γi initial configuration.
Additionally, an arbitrary number of liquidators (three) are added to each con-
figuration. This determines a race condition at each simulation step, as shown in
Figure 4.4.
5.3.2 Experimental results
1 obsAtStep ( i , x ) =
2 if ( s . rval (”steps”) == x )
3 then s . rval ( i )
4 else # obsAtStep ( i , x )
5 fi ;
6 eval parametric ( E [ obsAtStep (”1_COLLATERALIZATION” , x ) ] ,
7 E [ obsAtStep (”2_COLLATERALIZATION” , x ) ] ,
8 E [ obsAtStep (”3_COLLATERALIZATION” , x ) ] ,
82The repayed debt amounts to Maxliq · t, with t total amount of repayable debt.
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9 E [ obsAtStep (”4_COLLATERALIZATION” , x ) ] ,
10 E [ obsAtStep (”5_COLLATERALIZATION” , x ) ] ,
11 E [ obsAtStep (”6_COLLATERALIZATION” , x ) ] ,
12 E [ obsAtStep (”7_COLLATERALIZATION” , x ) ] ,
13 E [ obsAtStep (”8_COLLATERALIZATION” , x ) ] ,
14 E [ obsAtStep (”9_COLLATERALIZATION” , x ) ] ,
15 E [ obsAtStep (”10_COLLATERALIZATION” , x ) ] ,
16 x , 1 , 1 , 91 ) ;
Listing 5.9: perAgentCollateralization.multiquatex - MultiQuaTEx prop-
erty producing the mean collateralization per agent (maximum 10 borrowers).
The results discussed in this section were obtained by performing MultiVeStA
experiments of the LP simulator. The evaluation was performed on an 8GB-RAM
machine with two 1.20GHz cores. Specifically, the inputs to the tool are: the LP
simulator discussed in Sections 3 and 4, the MultiQuaTEx property in Listing 5.9 and
a pair of statistical parameters (α, δ), discussed below. Consequently, MultiVeStA
potential of generating statistically-valid approximations is entirely employed, as no
bound to the number of simulations has been set, instead the simulator runs until
the required confidence interval (CI) is reached83. The next two paragraphs describe
the inputs to MultiVeStA, afterwards the results are introduced and discussed.
Listing 5.9 is the MultiQuaTEx property to be estimated. The property semantics
is to compute the expected collateralization value at each liquidation round and for
each borrower in the initial configurations, discussed in Section 5.3.1.
Figure 5.2 shows an example of the variables approximated by a bounded Multi-
VeStA execution84. Given the nature of the analysed variables in the figure, δ = 0.05
appears to be an acceptable confidence interval width. Additionally, the CI confidence
level is set to α = 0.05 so to obtain 95% statistical confidence.
Figures 5.3a to 5.3c illustrate the per-borrower collateralization in the eth-wbtc
prices scenario, for varying liquidation rounds and CMin-Rliq choices. Observing
the corresponding surface graphs in each prices scenarios (Figures B5a to B5c),
it is evident that undercollaterized agents have a very different behaviour than
overcollaterized ones. Specifically, the undercollaterized agents undergo very serious
liquidations, which often lead them to unrecoverability, as their collateralization
converges to a constant below Cmin. Contrarily, overcollaterized agents do not incur
in severe financial losses.
Additionally, Figures 5.4a to 5.4c show that the CMin-Rliq having the least
negative effects on undercollaterized balances is CMin = 1.5, Rliq = 1.1. This is also
quantitatively confirmed by the figures in Table 5.1. Intuitively, this is a consequence
of the fact that when Cmin = 1.5 and rliq = 1.1 the collateralization of each agent
b1 to b5 is higher on average than for any other Cmin and rliq pairs. As a result, the
number of unrecoverable loans, the ones held by agents whose collateralization is
below 1, is minimised.
83Figure B4 shows the amount of simulations required to compute the results for each prices
scenario.
84With α = 0.05, δ = 0.01 and n = 5010, maximum number of executions.
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Figure 5.2: Expected collateralization per agent at each liquidation round.
Finally, Figures 5.5a to 5.5c display that overcollaterized borrowers could still
incur in liquidations, in case the prices abruptly change as in the prices scenario
eth-wbtc85. Differently, in the other scenarios, employing the stable coin usdc,
overcollaterized agents are, on average, rarely liquidated.
Price scenario (CMin-Rliq)
(1.5-1.1) (1.4-1.1) (1.3-1.1)
eth-wbtc 0.7115 0.6518 0.6137
eth-usdc 0.7106 0.6583 0.6231
usdc-wbtc 0.8381 0.7739 0.7299
Table 5.1: Minimum average CΓ(B1 ) per liquidation round for the three (CMin-Rliq)
maximising CΓ(B1 ).
85This is mainly determined by the opposite drift and high volatility used to model the ETH and
WBTC prices evolution (Table 4.2).
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(a) Line graph for varying liquidation rounds.
(b) Figure 5.3a, rotated by 45 degrees around the z-axis.
(c) Surface graph corresponding to Figure 5.3b.
Figure 5.3: Per-borrower collateralization (b1 to b10) in the eth-wbtc prices scenario,















This chapter offers additional context to the specific research questions addressed
by the thesis. This is achieved firstly by Section 6.1, discussing and comparing
other research work. Secondly, Section 6.2 explains the limitations of this work and
attempts to offer solutions to these issues. Thirdly, Section 6.3 proposes ideas for
future research which could be conducted with the use of the developed tool.
6.1 Related work and contributions
Verification of DeFi Smart Contracts is a fairly recent research area where several
techniques have been applied, according to Liu et el. [36]. They classify the
contributions into two categories based on the investigation scope: program-based
and behaviour-based. The former research corpus investigates the correctness of
specific smart contracts programs, whereas the latter develops formal models for
them and considers significant properties of these models. Given the focus of this
thesis on developing a verification tool for an LP behavioural model, the rest of this
section considers only behaviour-based pieces of research.
Behaviour-based formal verification primarily follows two parallel directions:
1. verification of the model properties [11, 5, 2, 52];
2. statistical analysis of the model variables [4, 17, 33, 16, 26].
To the best of the author’s knowledge, Bigi et al. [11] presented the first work
on smart contract properties formal verification. Their study combines a game-
theoretic approach with probabilistic model checking, ultimately validating their
results with the model checker PRISM [34]. Using a similar methodology, Bai et
al. [5] investigated properties of these systems using the model checker SPIN [29] in
order to develop secure templates for smart contracts. Another example of research
in this direction is Tolmach et al. [52] which developed the first multi-pools model
and verified invariant properties initially formulated by [9]. Finally, Abdellatif and
Brousmiche [2] proposed a very relevant study on smart contracts, by modelling not
only the contracts and the agents’ behaviour but also the underlying blockchain by the
Behaviour Interaction Priorities (BIP) framework [8]. This work is also related to the
thesis as it made use of Statistical Model Checking (SMC) [30], a formal verification
technique which has strongly influenced the development of MultiVeStA [48, 53].
In fact, SMC verifies probabilistic properties of a model by using statistical means,
i.e. Monte-Carlo simulations, whose number is estimated on-the-fly. The estimation
is based on two input parameters the risk level, α, and the precision, δ. Then, if
p and p′ are, respectively, the real and the estimated probabilities for the property ϕ
to hold in a given state, simulations are performed until P(|p− p′| ≤ δ) ≥ 1−α holds
[2]. Thus, this methodology clearly resembles the technique employed by MultiVeStA,
shown in Section 2.3.3.
The more recent direction of studies on smart contracts is also loosely relevant
to Abdellatif et al. [2], as it also employs statistical methods. However, in this
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case, statistics is useful to estimate unknown variables of the analysed model, hence
deriving desirable properties. The quantitative variables estimation is also achieved
by performing Monte-Carlo simulations, except this time studies tend to analyse
more closely the behaviours displayed by the agents [17]. In fact, most of this
research [33, 16, 4] bases its results on Agent-Based Simulations (ABS), which is
employed to stress test the actual smart contracts implementations being executed
on a "custom-built Ethereum virtual machine that is written in C++" [33]. This
research direction, although suggesting promising results, is not ultimately supported
by strong statistical guarantees. This is mainly because the number of Monte Carlo
simulations performed to run their analyses is arbitrary chosen and not backed by a
formal justification [33, 26]. Nonetheless, a work relevant to this thesis is the analysis
conducted by Kao et al. [33] on the Compound protocol scalability in face of high
stock market prices volatility. Similarly to this thesis’s one, their analysis models
the prices by the use of the geometric Brownian motion as defined in Section 2.4.1.
However, their data collection and analysis methodologies are very different. In
fact, they do not sample entire historical periods as illustrated in Section 4.2 for
estimating prices volatility. Contrarily, they simply evaluate the minimum and
maximum volatility values ever observed and instantiate the GBM for different prices
volatilities so to simulate several market environments. Finally, the prices model in
Section 4.2 has been mostly inspired by Gudgeon et al. ’s work [26]. Similarly to [33],
they stress-test an LP model, not a specific implementation, by using the same price
model explained in Section 4.2. Nonetheless, a remarkable difference is that they
instantiate the predictions of the collateral and loan assets pairs with three different
correlation parameters. This thesis, instead, assumes predictions of prices pairs to be
strongly negatively correlated (ρ = −1), in order to simulate the worst-case scenario.
Additionally, it reproduced Gudgeon et al. ’s environment by using historical data of
three different real cryptoassets on the market.
Therefore, this thesis can be viewed as a development of both the aforementioned
research directions as it offers:
1. an accurate LP simulator which can support both the development of attacks
and novel game-theoretic properties (Section 5.1);
2. a model checker capable of conducting simple reachability analysis and verifying
whether LTL properties hold of specific system configurations (Section 5.2);
3. a tool for statistical analysis backed by the distributed and highly efficient
MultiVeStA engine (Section 5.3).
Additionally, the thesis shows that under the scenarios developed in Section 4 and
the assumptions explained in Section 5.3, Cmin = 1.5 and rliq = 1.1 is the optimal
parameters’ choice to instantiate the model.
6.2 Limitations and mitigations
Perhaps, the most evident limitation of this work is that reachability analysis and LTL
model checking are only capable of proving properties for configurations resulting in
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finite computations. However, the LP model represents highly concurrent systems
whose state space [6] is infinite. As a consequence, reachability analysis and LTL
model checking are only useful to either confute invariant properties or explore the
state space generated by some "interesting" initial states. This issue has been partially
mitigated by enabling the initial simulator to conduct statistical analyses, Section 4.3.
That allows to perform several bounded simulations of the model and conclude its
properties based on statistical means, as explained in Section 2.3.3.
With regards to this limitation, it is convenient to argue in favour of the selection
of the Maude system in order to specify and verify LP. This choice is motivated by
at least three reasons.
1. The Maude language expressive power and its outstanding flexibility in mod-
elling highly non-deterministic systems make Maude a suitable choice for
specifying LP, as shown in Section 3.
2. Maude formal verification environment enables to conduct a variety of formal
verification analyses on the specified systems, as illustrated in Section 5.
3. The Maude system is a free software project, distributed under the GNU-
GPLv2.0. This made possible to adapt its source code as necessary in order to
implement the tool. Listings A.2 and A.7 are the only files containing modules
part of the Maude native libraries which have been modified and integrated in
the tool.
Additionally, it could be argue that the LP simulator employed for statistical
analysis, as defined in Section 4.3, is not consistent with the predictions of the prices
in Section 4.2. This is mainly due to the fact that there is a one-to-one relation
between a price update and a liquidation action. Furthermore, the price model is
instantiated based on daily closing prices, which implicitly implies that predictions
should also represent the daily evolution of a cryptoasset’s closing prices. As a result,
the current system evolves as if only one liquidation per day occurred. This does
not seem to generate unexpected consequences on the statistical analysis’s results
explained in Section 5.3, but it might affect subsequent analyses. With respect to
this, a simple correction of the issue would consist of a minimal modification to the
logic of the model in Figure 4.4 so that the price update occurs only after the daily
average number of liquidations has been performed.
6.3 Future research
Future research supported by the developed tool encompasses various areas of partic-
ular interest. First, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 showed how the tool is capable of simulating
the LP model and verifying LTL properties for some initial configuration of LP. Con-
sequently, a possible future development could be the formalisation of new attacks
and properties of the model.
Secondly, the LP simulator used for statistical analysis could also be extended to
find an answer to at least two more research questions.
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1. Study the model resistance to illiquidity, as suggested by [33].
2. Investigate the behaviour of multi-pools configurations, each offering different
market opportunities86 to agents, as proposed by [55] and partially developed
in [52].
The first research question could be addressed by implementing a heuristic
for agents redeeming theirs collateral assets in a market environment promoting
liquidations. The second problem can be handled by simply extending the simulator
configuration in Listing 3.6, so that it contains multiple pools and integrating
the interest rate models87. Additionally, for the second research problem multiple
behaviours for a depositor might be developed. Two simple examples are risk-taking
depositor, willing to invest in the platform even in adverse market conditions, or
risk-adverse, depositing only when objectively convenient.
86In terms of prices and interest rates.
87For instance those in [27].
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This listing specifies the main abstract data types, utilised in the rest of the LP
model specifications. The main specified modules are:
SUBSET specifies sets of tokens types;
MAP models maps (or dictionaries) in Maude and it is mainly defined
accordingly to the native Maude library prelude.maude, as later
discussed;
MAP-TH implements functions (in the mathematical sense), binding target
sorts to the ones in FUNCTION;
FUNCTION implements functions (in the mathematical sense), containing the
logic for computing domain and codomain;
HO-FILTER implements the filtering using higher order functions.
The fundamental difference between Map{X,Y} used in LP specification and the
original is shown in Listing A.1, illustrating the declaration of the original Map{X,Y}’s
constructor. Notably, this operator differs than the LP one, Listing A.2 Line 189, for
the two reasons detailed below.
1. The former constructs a Map from Map terms only, whereas the latter constructs
a Map term incrementally from Entries.
2. The former does not utilise kinds, while the latter does.
These modifications to the original Map have been made, in order to develop the
type system of tokens’ Maps, which is not discussed in this thesis.
op _,_ : Map{X,Y} Map{X,Y} -> Map{X,Y}
[ctor assoc comm id: empty prec 121 format (d r os d)] .





fmod SUBSET {X :: TRIV , Y :: TRIV} is
including SET{Y} .
103 sorts NeSet{X} Set{X} .
subsort X$Elt < Y$Elt .
subsort NeSet{X} < NeSet{Y} .
subsort Set{X} < Set{Y} .
108
subsort X$Elt < NeSet{X} < Set{X} .
op _,_ : Set{X} Y$Elt -> Set{Y}
[ctor id: empty assoc comm prec 121 format (d r os d)] .
113
op _,_ : Set{X} Set{X} -> Set{X} [ctor ditto] .






fmod MAP{X :: TRIV , Y :: TRIV} is
including BOOL .
sorts Entry{X,Y} Map{X,Y} .
177 subsort Entry{X,Y} < Map{X,Y} .
op _|->_ : X$Elt Y$Elt -> Entry{X,Y} [ctor prec 50] .
op emptyM : -> Map{X,Y} [ctor] .
--- original
182 --- op _,_ : Map{X,Y} Map{X,Y} -> Map{X,Y}
--- [ctor assoc comm id: empty prec 121 format (d r os d)] .
--- the Entry tries to solve the collapse problem
--- described in 20.3.6
187 --- the [Map] solves the problem introduced by tokens
--- subtypying
op _;_ : [Map{X,Y}] Entry{X,Y} -> [Map{X,Y}]
[ctor assoc comm id: emptyM prec 51 format (d r os d)] .
op undefined : -> [Y$Elt] [ctor] .
192
var D : X$Elt .
vars R R’ : Y$Elt .
var M : Map{X,Y} .
197 mb (M:Map{X,Y}); (E:Entry{X,Y}) : Map{X,Y} .
op insert : X$Elt Y$Elt Map{X,Y} -> Map{X,Y} .
90
eq insert (D, R, (M ; D |-> R ’)) =
if $hasMapping (M, D) then insert (D, R, M)
202 else (M ; D |-> R)
fi .
eq insert (D, R, M) = (M ; D |-> R) [owise] .
op _[_] : Map{X,Y} X$Elt -> [Y$Elt] [prec 21] .
207 --- _+_ is 22
eq (M ; D |-> R)[D] =
if $hasMapping (M, D) then undefined
else R
fi .
212 eq M[D] = undefined [owise] .
op $hasMapping : Map{X,Y} X$Elt -> Bool .
eq $hasMapping ((M ; D |-> R), D) = true .





fth MAP - THEORY is
sorts M E DT CT D C .
subsort E < M .
233 op _|->_ : DT CT -> E [ctor] .
op _;_ : [M] E -> [M] [ctor id: emptyM assoc comm prec
121 format (d r os d)] .
op emptyM : -> M .
238 subsort DT < D .
subsort CT < C .
op emptyC : -> C .
op _,_ : D DT -> D
[ctor assoc comm prec 121 format (d r os d)] .
243
op emptyD : -> D .
op _,_ : C CT -> C





285 fmod FUNCTION {MT :: MAP - THEORY } is
var map : MT$M .
var domElt : MT$DT .
var codElt : MT$CT .
var domSet : MT$D .
290 var codSet : MT$C .
op dom : MT$M -> MT$D .
eq dom(map) = $dom(map , emptyD ) .
295 op $dom : MT$M MT$D -> MT$D .
91
eq $dom (( map ; domElt |-> codElt ), domSet ) =
$dom(map , (domSet , domElt )) .
eq $dom (( domElt |-> codElt ), domSet ) = domSet , domElt .
eq $dom(emptyM , domSet ) = domSet .
300
op cod : MT$M -> MT$C .
eq cod(map) = $cod(map , emptyC ) .
op $cod : MT$M MT$C -> MT$C .
305 eq $cod (( map ; domElt |-> codElt ), codSet ) =
$cod(map , (codSet , codElt )) .
eq $cod (( domElt |-> codElt ), codSet ) = codSet , codElt .
eq $cod(emptyM , codSet ) = codSet .
endfm
310
view FUNCTION {M :: MAP - THEORY } from TRIV to FUNCTION {M} is
sort Elt to M$M .
endv
315 fmod AP{X :: TRIV , Y :: TRIV} is
sort Func{X, Y} .
op _[_] : Func{X, Y} X$Elt -> Y$Elt [prec 17] .
endfm
320 fmod AP -BIN{X :: TRIV , Y :: TRIV , Z :: TRIV} is
sort Func{X, Y, Z} .
op _[_,_] : Func{X, Y, Z} X$Elt Y$Elt -> Z$Elt [prec 17] .
endfm
325 fmod HO1{X :: TRIV} is
inc LIST{X} .
endfm
fmod HO2{X :: TRIV , Y :: TRIV} is
330 inc HO1{X} .
inc LIST{Y} .
endfm
335 fmod HO - FILTER {X :: TRIV} is
including HO1{X} .
including BOOL .
inc AP{X, Bool} .
340 var E : X$Elt .
var L : List{X} .
var P : Func{X, Bool} . --- predicate
op filter : List{X} Func{X, Bool} -> List{X} .
345 eq filter (nil , P) = nil .
ceq filter (E | L, P) = E | filter (L, P)
if P[E] .






Listing A.2: abstract-datatypes.maude - Maude specifications of parame-
terised data types
A.2 Tokens







--- native token is unique (not a set) and it ’s free (it
--- can be transferred )
sort Token Free -Token Minted -Token .
subsort Minted -Token Free -Token < Token .
10
sort Native -Token .
subsort Native -Token < Free -Token .
op tauError : -> [Token] .
15 op dummyTau : Nat -> Free -Token .
--- _[_] has prec 21
op tau(_) : Nat -> Free -Token
[ctor prec 19 format (y! d d d o)] .
20 --- _[_] has prec 21
op _’ : Free -Token -> Minted -Token
[ctor prec 20 format (d b! o)] .
op ethtau : -> Native -Token .
endfm
25
view Token from TRIV to TOKENS is
sort Elt to Token .
endv
30 view Free -Token from TRIV to TOKENS is
sort Elt to Free -Token .
endv
view Native -Token from TRIV to TOKENS is
35 sort Elt to Native -Token .
endv
view Minted -Token from TRIV to TOKENS is
sort Elt to Minted -Token .
93
40 endv
fmod TOKEN -SETS is
including TOKENS .
including SUBSET {Free -Token , Token} .
45 including SUBSET {Minted -Token , Token} .
op freeTokenSet : -> Set{Free -Token} .
eq freeTokenSet = tau (0), tau (1) .
50 op mintableTokenSet : -> Set{Minted -Token} .
eq mintableTokenSet = tau (0)’, tau (1)’ .
op allTokenSet : -> Set{Token} .
eq allTokenSet = ethtau , freeTokenSet , mintableTokenSet .
55
vars anyTau : Token .
vars anyTauSet curFTok : Set{Token} .
op filterFree : Set{Token} -> Set{Free -Token} .
60 eq filterFree ( anyTauSet ) =
$filterFree (anyTauSet , empty) .
op $filterFree : Set{Token} Set{Free -Token} ->
Set{Free -Token} .
65 eq $filterFree (empty , curFTok ) = curFTok .
eq $filterFree (( anyTauSet , anyTau ), curFTok ) =
if anyTau :: Free -Token
then
$filterFree (anyTauSet , (curFTok , anyTau ))
70 else
$filterFree (anyTauSet , curFTok )
fi .
op filterMinted : Set{Token} -> Set{Minted -Token} .
75 eq filterMinted ( anyTauSet ) =
anyTauSet \ filterFree ( anyTauSet ) .
op getFirst : NeSet{Token} -> Token .
eq getFirst (( anyTauSet , anyTau )) = anyTau .
80
endfm
fmod TOKEN - LISTS is
including TOKENS .
85 including SUBLIST {Free -Token , Token} .
including SUBLIST {Minted -Token , Token} .
op freeTokenList : -> List{Free -Token} .
eq freeTokenList = tau (0) | tau (1) .
90
op mintableTokenList : -> List{Minted -Token} .
eq mintableTokenList = tau (0)’ | tau (1)’ .
94
op allTokenList : -> List{Token} .
95 eq allTokenList = ethtau | freeTokenList |
mintableTokenList .
endfm
100 fmod TOKEN -MAP is
including TOKEN -SETS .
including MAP{Token , Float0 +} .
including SET{ Float0 +} .
endfm
105
view PiFFun from MAP - THEORY
to TOKEN -MAP is
sort M to Map{Token , Float0 +} .
sort E to Entry{Token , Float0 +} .
110
sort DT to Token .
sort CT to Float0 + .
sort D to Set{Token} .
115 sort C to Set{ Float0 +} .
op emptyD to empty .
op emptyC to empty .
endv
120
fmod SUBTOKEN - FUNCTIONS is
--- importing agents
including AGENT -ID -SETS .
125 including FUNCTION { PiFFun } .
including SUBMAP {Free -Token , Float0 +, PiFFun } .
including SUBMAP {Minted -Token , Float0 +, PiFFun } .
including MAP{Free -Token , Pair{Token , Float0 +}} .
130 --- pi_loan & pi_fund /free & price
------ (Free -Token -> Float0 +) < (Token -> Float0 +)
including MAP{Agent -Id , Map{Token , Float0 +}} .
--- For increased type accuracy use this:
135 --- including MAP{Agent -Id , Map{Free -Token , Float0 +}} .
including SET{Pair{Token , Float0 +}} .
including SET{Map{Token , Float0 +}} .
endfm
140
view PiLFun from MAP - THEORY
to SUBTOKEN - FUNCTIONS is
sort M to Map{Agent -Id , Map{Token , Float0 +}} .
sort E to Entry{Agent -Id , Map{Token , Float0 +}} .
145
95
sort DT to Agent -Id .
sort CT to Map{Token , Float0 +} .
sort D to Set{Agent -Id} .
150 sort C to Set{Map{Token , Float0 +}} .
op emptyD to empty .
op emptyC to empty .
endv
155
view PiMFun from MAP - THEORY
to SUBTOKEN - FUNCTIONS is
sort M to Map{Free -Token ,
Pair{Token , Float0 +}} .
160 sort E to Entry{Free -Token ,
Pair{Token , Float0 +}} .
sort DT to Token .
sort CT to Pair{Token , Float0 +} .
165
sort D to Set{Token} .
sort C to Set{Pair{Token , Float0 +}} .
op emptyD to empty .
170 op emptyC to empty .
endv
fmod HO -EXISTS -TEST is
extending HO - EXISTS {Token} .
175
var tau : Token .
op isFree : -> Func{Token , Bool} .




view TokenFun from MAP - THEORY to SUBTOKEN - FUNCTIONS is
sort M to Map{Token , Float0 +} .
185 sort E to Entry{Token , Float0 +} .
sort DT to Token .
sort CT to Float0 + .
190 sort D to Set{Token} .
sort C to Set{ Float0 +} .
op emptyD to empty .
op emptyC to empty .
195 endv
Listing A.3: tokens.maude - Maude specifications of tokens
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A.3 Wallets
This listing specifies the sorts and operators implementing the wallets function σ.
The main specified modules are:
WALLET defines the syntax and APIs offered by the wallets function, σ;
PI-FUND defines the syntax and APIs offered by πf .
fmod WALLET is
including MAP{Token , Float0 +} .
var bal : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
6 var tau : Token .
var v v’ : Float0 + .
op _+_:_ : Map{Token , Float0 +} Float0 + Token ->
Map{Token , Float0 +} [prec 22] .
11 ceq bal + v : tau = insert (tau , (bal[tau ]) + v, bal)
if bal[tau] =/= undefined .
eq bal + v : tau = insert (tau , v, bal) [owise] .
op _-_:_ : Map{Token , Float0 +} Float0 + Token ->
16 Map{Token , Float0 +} [prec 22] .
ceq bal - v : tau = insert (tau , (bal[tau ]) - v, bal)
if bal[tau] =/= ( undefined ). Float0 + /\
(bal[tau] - v) : Float0 + .
eq bal - v : tau = bal [owise] .
21
op _*_:_ : Map{Token , Float0 +} Float0 + Token ->
Map{Token , Float0 +} [prec 21] .
ceq bal * v : tau = insert (tau , (bal[tau ]) * v, bal)
if bal[tau] =/= undefined .
26 eq bal * v : tau = bal [owise] .
vars m0 m1 : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
op _*_ : Map{Token , Float0 +} Map{Token , Float0 +}
31 -> Map{Token , Float0 +} [prec 22] .
eq m0 * emptyM = m0 .
eq m0 * (tau |-> v) = m0 * v : tau .
eq m0 * (m1 ; (tau |-> v)) = (m0 * v : tau) * m1 .
36 endfm
fmod PI -FUND is
including FUNCTION { PiFFun } .
97
41 --- tells if 2 maps , with equal domain , forall token in
--- their domains are equals with a difference of at
--- most eps
var eps : Float0 + .
var m m’ : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
46 var tau : Token .
var tokS : Set{Token} .
var v v’ : Float0 + .
op _~=_:_ : Map{Token , Float0 +}
51 Float0 + Float0 + -> Bool .
eq emptyM ~= v’ : eps = true .
eq (m ; tau |-> v) ~= v’ : eps =
if abs(v - v’) <= eps then




op _~=_:_ : Map{Token , Float0 +}
61 Map{Token , Float0 +} Float0 +
-> Bool .
eq m ~= m’ : eps =
if (dom(m) == dom(m ’)) then




71 op _~=[_]_:_ : Map{Token , Float0 +} Set{Token}
Map{Token , Float0 +} Float0 +
-> Bool .
eq m ~=[ empty] m’ : eps = true .
eq m ~=[ tau] m’ : eps = abs(m[tau] - m’[ tau ]) <= eps .
76 eq m ~=[ tokS , tau] m’ : eps =
if abs(m[tau] - m’[ tau ]) <= eps
then




op _~<[_]_:_ : Map{Token , Float0 +} Set{Token}
Map{Token , Float0 +} Float0 +
86 -> Bool .
eq m ~<[ empty] m’ : eps = true .
eq m ~<[ tau] m’ : eps = (m’[ tau] - m[tau ]) > eps .
eq m ~<[tokS , tau] m’ : eps =
if (m’[ tau] - m[tau ]) > eps
91 then






op _~<_:_ : Map{Token , Float0 +}
Map{Token , Float0 +} Float0 +
-> Bool .
eq m ~< m’ : eps =
101 if (m’ =/= emptyM ) and -then
(( dom(m) == empty) or -else
(dom(m) subset dom(m ’))) then








Listing A.4: wallets.maude - Maude specifications of agent wallets and πf
A.4 Pools
This listing specifies the sorts and operators implementing the pool object π. The
main specified modules are:
LP defines the services offered by a pool π;










eq ( undefined ). Set{ Float0 +} = 0.0 .
*** eq snd (( undefined ). Set{Pair{Token , Float0 +}}) =
77 *** 0.0 .
eq ( undefined ). Set{Map{Token , Float0 +}} + v : tau =
tau |-> v .
eq ( undefined ). Map{Token , Float0 +}[ tau] = 0.0 .
99
82 var pi : Pi .
var pi_f : Map{Free -Token , Float0 +} .
--- For increased type accuracy use this:
*** var pi_l : Map{Agent -Id , Map{Free -Token , Float0 +}
var pi_l : Map{Agent -Id , Map{Token , Float0 +}} .
87 var pi_m : Map{Free -Token ,
Pair{Token , Float0 +}} .
var v : Float0 + .
var tau : Token .
92 vars fTau fTau ’ fTau ’’ : Free -Token .
vars mTau : Minted -Token .
var mintedPair : Pair{Token , Float0 +} .
var fTokenSet fTokenSet ’ : Set{Free -Token} .
97 op {fund:_, loan:_, mint:_} :
Map{Free -Token , Float0 +}
Map{Agent -Id , Map{Token , Float0 +}}
Map{Free -Token , Pair{Token , Float0 +}} -> Pi
[prec 49 ctor] .
102 *** NOTE: pretty printing removed for multivesta
*** format (nt++ nti d d nti d d nti d nt d) ] .
op _.fund : Pi -> Map{Free -Token , Float0 +}
[prec 20 format (d - d)] . --- 21 is []
107 eq ({ fund: pi_f , loan: pi_l , mint: pi_m }). fund = pi_f .
eq ({ fund: emptyM , loan: pi_l , mint: pi_m }). fund =
( emptyM ). Map{Free -Token , Float0 +} .
op _.loan : Pi -> Map{Agent -Id , Map{Token , Float0 +}}
112 [prec 20 format (d - d)] . --- 21 is []
eq ({ fund: emptyM , loan: pi_l , mint: pi_m }). loan = pi_l .
eq ({ fund: pi_f , loan: pi_l , mint: pi_m }). loan = pi_l .
op _.mint : Pi ->
117 Map{Free -Token , Pair{Token , Float0 +}}
[prec 20 format (d - d)] . --- 21 is []
eq ({ fund: emptyM , loan: pi_l , mint: pi_m }). mint = pi_m .
eq ({ fund: pi_f , loan: pi_l , mint: pi_m }). mint = pi_m .
122
op emptyPi : -> Pi .
eq emptyPi = {fund: emptyM , loan: emptyM , mint: emptyM } .
mb {fund: ( emptyM ). Map{Token , Float0 +},
127 loan: pi_l , mint: pi_m} : Pi .
op isInitial : Pi -> Bool .
eq isInitial (pi) = pi == ( emptyPi ) .
132
100
--- Map{Agent -Id , Map{Token , Float0 +}}
op sum : Pi Free -Token -> Float0 + .
eq sum( pi , fTau ) = $sum( (pi).loan , fTau ,
137 dom ((pi). loan), 0.0) .
var aSet : Set{Agent -Id} .
var a : Agent -Id .
142 op $sum : Map{Agent -Id ,Map{Token , Float0 +}} Free -Token
Set{Agent -Id} Float0 + -> Float0 + .
eq $sum(pi_l , fTau , (empty ). Set{Agent -Id}, v) = v .
eq $sum(pi_l , fTau , (aSet , a), v) =
if (pi_l[a]) [fTau] =/= undefined then
147 $sum(pi_l , fTau , aSet , v + (pi_l[a]) [fTau ])
else
$sum(pi_l , fTau , aSet , v)
fi .
152 op _.ER_ : Pi Free -Token -> Float0 + [prec 30] .
--- _*_ 31
ceq (pi ).ER(fTau) = ((pi). fund[fTau] + sum(pi , fTau )) /
snd ((pi). mint[fTau ])
if (pi). fund[fTau] > 0.0 .
157 eq (pi).ER(fTau) = 1.0 [owise] .
--- returns the minted token with respect to a
--- single free token (i.e. fTau ’ for fTau free -token ,
--- for fTau = fst (\pi.mint(fTau ’))
162 op minted : Pi Free -Token -> Minted -Token .
eq minted (pi , fTau) =
if (pi). mint == emptyM then
empty
else
167 $minted ( (pi).mint , fTau)
fi .
--- auxiliary for minted (Pi Token)
op $minted :
172 Map{Free -Token , Pair{Token , Float0 +}}
Free -Token ->
Minted -Token .
eq $minted ( (fTau ’ |-> mintedPair ), fTau) =
if (fTau == fTau ’) then




eq $minted ( (pi_m ; (fTau ’ |-> mintedPair )), fTau) =
182 if (fTau == fTau ’) then
fst( mintedPair )
else




--- gets the free tokens (dom(pi_f ))
op (_). freeTokens : Pi -> Set{Free -Token} .
eq (pi). freeTokens = dom ((pi). fund) .
192 --- gets the minted tokens (cod(fst(pi_m )))
op (_). mintedTokens : Pi -> Set{Minted -Token} .
eq (pi). mintedTokens =
$mintedTokens (cod ((pi). mint), empty) .
197 var mTokPairSet : Set{Pair{Token , Float0 +}} .
var tokenSet : Set{Token} .
op $mintedTokens : Set{Pair{Token , Float0 +}}
Set{Token} -> Set{Minted -Token} .
202 eq $mintedTokens (empty , tokenSet ) = tokenSet .
eq $mintedTokens (( mTokPairSet , mintedPair ), tokenSet ) =
$mintedTokens ( mTokPairSet ,
(tokenSet , fst( mintedPair ))) .
eq $mintedTokens (( mintedPair ), tokenSet ) =
207 (tokenSet , fst( mintedPair )) .
--- underlying minted tokens function
--- Assumption :
op _.u_ : Pi Minted -Token -> Free -Token
212 [prec 21] . --- _+_:_ prec is 22
eq (pi).u(mTau) = if ( (pi). mint =/= emptyM )
then




--- auxiliary for u
op $u :
222 Map{Free -Token , Pair{Token , Float0 +}}
Minted -Token -> Free -Token .
eq $u( (pi_m ; (fTau |-> mintedPair )), mTau ) =









--- Abstract Blockchain configuration module
283 fmod BC{X :: BC -ENV} is
--- BC: BlockChain Configuration
sort BC{X} .
op _|_ : X$Env X$Price -> BC{X} [prec 53] .
--- NOTE: pretty printing removed for multivesta
102
288 *** format (d bn++s ont n)] .
endfm
fmod BC -LP is
293 including BC{LP} .
var pi : Pi .
var price : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
298 --- isInitial : true iff lending pools blockchain context
--- is initial
--- i.e. \pi_i = empty \ forall \pi_i in \pi.keys ()
op isInitial : BC{LP} -> Bool .
eq isInitial (pi | price) = isInitial (pi) .
303
op _.pi : BC{LP} -> Pi [prec 21] . --- 22 is .mint
eq (pi | price ).pi = pi .
op _.price : BC{LP} -> Map{Token , Float0 +}
308 [prec 21] . --- 22 is .mint





Listing A.5: pools.maude - Maude specifications of LPs main data structure: π
A.5 Configurations
This listing specifies the sorts and operators implementing a lending pool configuration
Γ. The main specified modules are:
CONFIGURATION models a generic Maude configuration and it is mainly defined
accordingly to the native Maude library prelude.maude, as later
discussed;
LP-PARAMETERS defines the LP parameters Cmin, rliq and Maxliq;
BC-LP-MODEL defines the LP rules;
BC-LP-MOD-MOD defines extra services for an LP configuration, used for the
integration with MultiVeStA.
It is essential to note that Maude provides the implementation for a generic
103
Configuration88. However, the LP Configuration is slightly different and corre-
sponds to the one shown in Listings 2.2 and A.7, Line 1. Listing A.6 illustrates
the original constructor for a Configuration multiset, which is the only remarkable
difference with the LP Configuration, in Listing A.7, Line 16. As it is evident, the
change only affects the operator input sorts, being [Configuration] in the operator
used by LP specifications and Configuration in the original. This is motivated by
the fact that [Configuration] identifies the kind of sort Configuration. Conse-
quently, the adopted operator allows to define well-formed terms for a Configuration
by simply defining a conditional membership equation statement as the one shown
in Listing A.7, Line 86. From the listing, a well-formed Configuration is defined to
be one satisfying the condition isLPStateUnique. Intuitively, this function checks
that only one term (pi | p):BC{LP} is contained in the input Configuration.
op __ : Configuration Configuration -> Configuration
[prec 53 ctor config assoc comm id: none] .
Listing A.6: Maude original definition of Configuration, as per prelude.maude.
mod CONFIGURATION is
sorts Attribute AttributeSet .
subsort Attribute < AttributeSet .
op none : -> AttributeSet [ctor] .
5 op _,_ : AttributeSet AttributeSet -> AttributeSet
[ctor assoc comm id: none] .
sorts Oid Cid Object Msg Portal Configuration .
subsort Object Msg Portal < Configuration .
10 op <_:_|_> : Oid Cid AttributeSet -> Object
[ctor object ].
*** NOTE: pretty printing removed for multivesta
*** format (n d d d d d d d)] .
op none : -> Configuration [ctor] .
15 op errorConfig : -> [ Configuration ] .
op __ : [ Configuration ] [ Configuration ] -> [ Configuration ]
[prec 53 ctor config assoc comm id: none] .
op <> : -> Portal [ctor] .
20
var oid : Oid .
var cid : Cid .
var atts : AttributeSet .
var obj : Object .
25 vars msg msg ’ : Msg .
vars gamma gamma ’ : [ Configuration ] .
op unknownClass : -> Cid [ctor] .
op _.cid : Object -> Cid [prec 50] .
88Introduced in Section 2.2.2.
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30 eq (< oid : cid | atts >). cid = cid .
eq (obj ). cid = unknownClass .
op unknownObjId : -> Oid [ctor] .
op _.oid : Object -> Oid [prec 50] .
35 eq (< oid : cid | atts >). oid = oid .
eq (obj ). oid = unknownObjId .
op _in_ : Msg [ Configuration ] -> Bool .
eq msg in (none) = false .
40 eq msg in (gamma obj) = msg in (gamma) .
eq msg in (gamma msg) = true .





mod BC -LP -CONFIG - COMPONENTS is
53 including BC -LP .
including PAIR{Agent -Id , Float0 +} .
including CONFIGURATION .
--- ------------------- Pool --------------------------------
58 subsort BC{LP} < Object .
--- ---------------- Coll object in config --------------
op C : Int -> Oid .
op Coll : -> Cid [ctor] .
63 op *_ : Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +} -> Attribute
[ctor gather (&)] .
--- -------------------- BC Round ---------------------------
op R : Int -> Oid .
68 op Round : -> Cid [ctor] .
op *_ : Int -> Attribute
[ctor gather (&)] .
--- ------------------- closedConfiguration -----------------
73 var wf -gamma : Configuration .
sort closedConfiguration .
op [_] : Configuration -> closedConfiguration [prec 50] .
op (_). config : closedConfiguration -> Configuration .
78 eq ([wf - gamma ]). config = wf -gamma .
vars gamma gamma ’ : [ Configuration ] .
var sigma : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
var lp lp ’ : BC{LP} .
83 var N : Nat .
--- LP State uniqueness check




op isLPStateUnique : [ Configuration ] Nat -> Nat .
eq isLPStateUnique (gamma lp , N) =
isLPStateUnique (gamma , N + 1) .
93 eq isLPStateUnique (lp , N) = N + 1 .
eq isLPStateUnique (none , N) = N .
eq isLPStateUnique (none gamma , N) = N .
eq isLPStateUnique (gamma gamma ’, N) =





mod LP - PARAMETERS is
including CONFIGURATION .
including FLOAT0 + .
114 including INT .
op P : Int -> Oid .
op LiqParams : -> Cid [ctor] .
119 sort Param .
ops CMin Rliq : Float0 + -> Param .
subsort Param < Attribute .
sort Params .
124 subsort Params < Object .
var n : Int .
vars cminV rliqV : Float0 + .
var params : AttributeSet .
129 mb < P(n) : LiqParams | CMin(cminV),
Rliq(rliqV) > : Params .
var paramObj : Params .
op (_). CMin : Params -> Float0 + .
134 eq (< P(n) : LiqParams | CMin(cminV),
Rliq( rliqV) >). CMin = cminV .
op (_). Rliq : Params -> Float0 + .
eq (< P(n) : LiqParams | CMin(cminV),
139 Rliq( rliqV) >). Rliq = rliqV .
op Maxliq : -> Float0 + .
eq Maxliq = 0.5 .
144 --- used as placeholder for undefined collateralization
op - : -> Float0 + .
endm
mod AGENT -STATE is
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149 including CONFIGURATION .
including MAP{Token , Float0 +} .
including AGENT -ID .
including LP - PARAMETERS .
154 --- -------------------- Agent -State ------------------------
sort Agent -State .
subsort Agent -State < Cid .
op noState : -> Agent -State [ctor] .
159 var s : Float0 + .
op LIQ -Speed : Float0 + -> [Agent -State] [ctor] .
cmb LIQ -Speed(s) : Agent -State if s <= Maxliq .
164 op LIQ - MaxSpeed : -> [Agent -State] [ctor] .
eq LIQ - MaxSpeed = LIQ -Speed( Maxliq ) .
op *_ : Map{Token , Float0 +} -> Attribute
[ctor gather (&)] .
169
var A0 : Agent -Id .
var b : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
var agState : Agent -State .
174
sort Agent .
subsort Agent < Object .
subsort Agent -Id < Oid .
mb < A0 : agState | * b > : Agent .
179
-------- Agent -State = (Agent -Type , Agent - Action ) --------





mod BC -LP - CONFIGURATION is
202 including BC -LP -CONFIG - COMPONENTS .
including AGENT -STATE .
including LP - PARAMETERS .
--- -------------- short deconstructors -------------
207 var gamma : [ Configuration ] .
var obj : Object .
op objectNotFound : -> [ Object ] .
op _.lp : [ Configuration ] -> BC{LP} .
212 eq (none ).lp = objectNotFound .
ceq (( gamma obj )). lp = obj if obj :: BC{LP} .
eq (( gamma obj )). lp = (gamma ).lp [owise] .
var wf -gamma : Configuration .
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217 op (_). mintedTokens : Configuration ->
Set{Minted -Token} .
eq (wf -gamma ). mintedTokens =
(((wf -gamma ).lp).pi). mintedTokens .
222 op (_).pi.f : Configuration ->
Map{Free -Token , Float0 +} .
eq (wf -gamma ).pi.f = (((wf -gamma ).lp).pi). fund .
op (_).pi.l : Configuration ->
227 Map{Agent -Id , Map{Token , Float0 +}} .
eq (wf -gamma ).pi.l = (((wf -gamma ).lp).pi). loan .
op (_).pi.m : Configuration ->
Map{Free -Token , Pair{Token , Float0 +}} .
232 eq (wf -gamma ).pi.m = (((wf -gamma ).lp).pi). mint .
var tau ’ : Minted -Token .
op (_).u(_) : Configuration Minted -Token ->
237 Free -Token .
eq (wf -gamma ).u(tau ’) = (((wf -gamma ).lp).pi).u(tau ’) .
--- --------------------- tokens --------------------------
242 var tSet : Set{Token} .
var agents : [ Configuration ] .
--- NOTE: it assumes that agents ’ sigmas have no
--- minted tokens in their domains (as it
247 --- should be for)
op (_). freeTokens : closedConfiguration ->
Set{Free -Token} .
eq ( cGamma ). freeTokens =
$freeTokens (( cGamma ). sigmas , empty ) .
252
op $freeTokens : [ Configuration ] Set{Token} ->
Set{Token} .
eq $freeTokens (none , tSet) = tSet .
eq $freeTokens (( agents < A0 : agState | * w >), tSet) =
257 $freeTokens (agents ,
( filterFree (dom(w) ), tSet )) .
--- --------------------- agents --------------------------
262 var A0 : Agent -Id .
var agState : Agent -State .
var attr : AttributeSet .
var msg : Msg .
var cGamma : closedConfiguration .
267 var aSet : Set{Agent -Id} .
op _. agent_ : [ Configuration ] Agent -Id -> Object
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[prec 50] .
var w : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
272
eq (none ). agent(A0) = objectNotFound .
ceq (( gamma obj )). agent(A0) = obj
if < A0 : agState | * w > := obj .
eq (( gamma obj )). agent(A0) =
277 (gamma ). agent(A0) [owise] .
var port : Portal .
op (_). agents : Configuration -> Set{Agent -Id} .
eq (gamma ). agents = $agents (gamma , empty) .
282
op $agents : [ Configuration ] Set{Agent -Id} -> Set{Agent -Id} .
eq $agents (none , aSet) = aSet .
eq $agents (gamma < A0 : agState | attr >, aSet) =
$agents (gamma , (aSet , A0) ) .
287 eq $agents (gamma obj , aSet) = $agents (gamma , aSet) .
eq $agents (gamma msg , aSet) = $agents (gamma , aSet) .
eq $agents (gamma port , aSet) = $agents (gamma , aSet) .
--- -------------------- wallets -------------------------
292 op _.sigma : Object -> Map{Token , Float0 +}
[prec 20] . --- 21 is []
eq (< A0 : agState | * w >). sigma = w .
op _.sigma : Object -> Map{Token , Float0 +}
[prec 20] . --- 21 is []
297 --- NOTE: not used
op isSigma : Object -> Bool .
ceq isSigma (obj) = true
if < A0 : agState | * w > := obj .
eq isSigma (obj) = false [owise] .
302
var sigmas : [ Configuration ] .
op (_). sigmas : closedConfiguration -> [ Configuration ] .
307 eq ( cGamma ). sigmas = $sigmas (( cGamma ). config , none) .
op $sigmas : [ Configuration ] [ Configuration ] ->
[ Configuration ] .
eq $sigmas (none , sigmas ) = sigmas .
312 eq $sigmas (gamma < A0 : agState | attr >, sigmas ) =
$sigmas (gamma , sigmas < A0 : agState | attr >) .
eq $sigmas (gamma obj , sigmas ) = $sigmas (gamma , sigmas ) .
eq $sigmas (gamma msg , sigmas ) = $sigmas (gamma , sigmas ) .
317 --- -------------- Params ---------------------------
--- assumes there is only one LiqParams object
op (_). params : Configuration -> [ Configuration ] .
eq (gamma ). params = $params (gamma) .
322 var paramObj : Params .
109
op $params : [ Configuration ] -> [ Configuration ] .
eq $params (none) = none .
eq $params (gamma paramObj ) = paramObj .
eq $params (gamma obj) = $params (gamma) .
327 eq $params (gamma msg) = $params (gamma) .
eq $params (gamma port) = $params (gamma) .
op (_). CMin : Configuration -> Float0 + .
eq (gamma ). CMin = (( gamma ). params ). CMin .
332
op (_). Rliq : Configuration -> Float0 + .





mod BC -LP -MODEL is
812 including CONFIGURATION - OBSERVERS .




--- --------------------- Rules -----------------------------
--- ----------------------- DEPOSIT -------------------------
908 var agState agState ’ : Agent -State .
var pi ’ : Pi .
vars c0 c1 : Float0 + .
913 var r : Int .
var tau : Free -Token .
var v v’ : Float0 + .
var pi_f : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
var pi_l : Map{Agent -Id , Map{Token , Float0 +}} .
918 var pi_m : Map{Free -Token , Pair{Token , Float0 +}} .
vars p p’ : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
var attrS : AttributeSet .
var oid : Oid .
923 var cid : Cid .
var A0 : Agent -Id .
var pi : Pi .
op _. attributes : Object -> AttributeSet [prec 50] .
928 eq (< oid : cid | attrS >). attributes = attrS .
eq (obj ). attributes = none .
op deposit : Agent -Id Pair{ Float0 +, Token} -> Msg [ctor] .
933 crl [ deposit ] :
[ gamma
< R(r) : Round | none >
< C(r) : Coll | attr >
110
< A0 : agState | * sigma >
938 (pi | p)
deposit (A0 , (v, tau )) ]
=> [ gamma
< R(r + 1) : Round | none >
< C(r + 1) : Coll | computeC (gamma ’, empty) >
943 < A0 : agState | * (sigma - v : tau)
+ v’ : (tau)’ >
(pi ’ | p) ]
if sigma[tau] >= v /\
{fund: pi_f , loan: pi_l , mint: pi_m} := pi /\
948 v’ := v / ((pi).ER(tau )) /\
pi ’ := {fund: (pi_f + v : tau), loan: pi_l ,
mint: (pi_m + v’ : tau) } /\
gamma ’ := gamma
< A0 : agState | * (sigma - v : tau)
953 + v’ : (tau)’ >




--- -------------------- LIQUIDATE -------------------------
op liquidate : Agent -Id Agent -Id
Pair{ Float0 +, Token}
1182 Minted -Token -> Msg [ctor] .
var B0 : Agent -Id .
vars sigmaA sigmaB
sigmaA ’ sigmaB ’ : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
1187
crl [ liquidate ] :
[ gamma --- i. represents the i-th
< R(r) : Round | none > --- constraint in the liqui -
< C(r) : Coll | attr > --- date action def
1192 < A0 : agState | * sigmaA > --- ( Figure 2.1)
< B0 : agState ’ | * sigmaB >
(pi | p)
liquidate (A0 , B0 , (v, tau), tau ’) ]
=> [ gamma
1197 < R(r + 1) : Round | none >
< C((r + 1)) : Coll | computeC (gamma ’, empty) >
< A0 : agState | * sigmaA ’ >
< B0 : agState ’ | * sigmaB ’ >
(pi ’ | p) ]
1202
if sigmaA [tau] >= v /\ --- 2.
(pi). loan[B0][ tau] >= v /\ --- 3.
v’ := v * (p[tau] / (p[(pi).u(tau ’)])) * --- 4.
(gamma ). Rliq /\
1207 sigmaB [tau ’] >= v’ /\ --- 5.
pi ’ := {
fund: (pi). fund + v : tau , --- 6.
111
loan: insert (B0 , --- 7.
1212 ((pi). loan[B0] - v : tau), (pi). loan),
mint: (pi). mint } /\
sigmaA ’ := ( sigmaA - v : tau) + v’ : tau ’ /\ --- 8.
sigmaB ’ := sigmaB - v’ : tau ’ /\ --- 9.
gamma ’ := gamma
1217 < A0 : agState | * sigmaA ’ >
< B0 : agState ’ | * sigmaB ’ >
(pi ’ | p) /\
(gamma < A0 : agState | * sigmaA >
< B0 : agState ’ | * sigmaB >
1222 (pi | p) ).C(B0) < (gamma ). CMin /\ --- 10.
(gamma ’).C(B0) <= (gamma ). CMin . --- 11.
--- -------------------- TRANSFER -------------------------
1227 op transfer : Agent -Id Agent -Id
Pair{ Float0 +, Token} -> Msg [ctor] .
crl [ transfer ] :
[ gamma
1232 < R(r) : Round | none >
< C(r) : Coll | attr >
< A0 : agState | * sigmaA >
< B0 : agState ’ | * sigmaB >
transfer (A0 , B0 , (v, tau )) ]
1237 => [ gamma
< R(r + 1) : Round | none >
< C(r + 1) : Coll | attr >
< A0 : agState | * sigmaA - v : tau >
< B0 : agState ’ | * sigmaB + v : tau > ]




mod BC -LP -MODEL - MODIFIERS is
including BC -LP -MODEL .
var cGamma : closedConfiguration .
var msg : Msg .
1760 var attrSet : AttributeSet .
var oid : Oid .
op _>_ : closedConfiguration Msg ->
closedConfiguration [prec 20] .
1765 eq cGamma > msg = [( cGamma ). config msg] .
var ill -gamma : [ Configuration ] .
op _>_ : closedConfiguration [ Configuration ] ->
closedConfiguration [prec 20] .
1770 eq cGamma > ill -gamma = [ ( cGamma ). config ill -gamma ] .
var gamma : [ Configuration ] .
112
var newP oldP : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
1775 var pi : Pi .
--- MultiVeStA - new price injection
op updatePrice (_,_) : Map{Token , Float0 +}
closedConfiguration
-> closedConfiguration .
1780 eq updatePrice (newP , [(pi | oldP) gamma ]) =
[(pi | newP) gamma] .
op genLiqParams (_,_) : Float0 + Float0 + ->
Configuration .
1785 eq genLiqParams (cminV , rliqV) =
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin(cminV), Rliq(rliqV) > .
op genCollObj (_) : closedConfiguration -> Object .
eq genCollObj ( cGamma ) =
1790 < C(0) : Coll | computeC (( cGamma ). config , empty) > .
vars cminV rliqV : Float0 + .
op addLiqParams (_,_,_) : Configuration Float0 +
Float0 + -> Configuration .
1795 eq addLiqParams (gamma , cminV , rliqV) =
gamma < P(0) : LiqParams | CMin(cminV),
Rliq(rliqV) > .
op addLiqParams (_,_,_) : closedConfiguration Float0 +
1800 Float0 + ->
closedConfiguration .
eq addLiqParams (cGamma , cminV , rliqV) =
[ addLiqParams (( cGamma ). config , cminV , rliqV) ] .
1805
op (_). replaceLiqParams (_,_) : closedConfiguration
Float0 + Float0 +
-> closedConfiguration .
eq ( cGamma ). replaceLiqParams (cminV , rliqV) =
1810 [ (( cGamma ). config ). $replaceLiqParams (none ,
cminV , rliqV) ] .
var gamma ’ : Configuration .
var attrS : AttributeSet .
1815 op (_). $replaceLiqParams (_,_,_) : Configuration
Configuration
Float0 + Float0 +
-> Configuration .
eq (none ). $replaceLiqParams (gamma ’, cminV , rliqV) =
1820 addLiqParams (gamma ’, cminV , rliqV) .
eq (gamma < P(0) : LiqParams | attrS >)
. $replaceLiqParams (gamma ’, cminV , rliqV) =
gamma < P(0) : LiqParams | CMin(cminV),
Rliq(rliqV) >
1825 gamma ’ .
eq (gamma ill -gamma)
113
. $replaceLiqParams (gamma ’, cminV , rliqV) =
(gamma)
. $replaceLiqParams (ill -gamma gamma ’, cminV , rliqV) .
1830 endm
Listing A.7: configurations.maude - Maude specifications of an LP configura-
tion
A.6 Agents





mod LOR - STRATEGY is
including BC -LP -MODEL .
including LIQUIDATOR -UTILS .
160 including LOR -DATA - STRUCTURES .
--- ------------ param selection top checks -----------------
--- checks if loan given by seized2Repaid (value -to - liquidate )
165 --- can be repaid by LOR
including HO - FILTER {Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }}} .
170 var gamma : Configuration .
var v : Float0 + .
vars LED LOR LED ’ : Agent -Id .
op (_). isLoanRepayable (_,_) : Configuration Float0 +
Agent -Id ->
175 Func{ Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }},
Bool } .
eq (gamma ). isLoanRepayable ( maxRep %, LOR)
180 [ ((LED , v’), (tau : tau ’)) ] =
(( gamma ). agent(LOR )). sigma[tau] >=
( ( seized2Repaid (( gamma ).lp , v’, tau , tau ’,
(gamma ). Rliq )) *
maxRep % ) .
185
op (_). filterRepayable (_,_,_) :
Configuration Float0 + Agent -Id
List{Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
ColPair {Free -Token ,
190 Minted -Token }}} ->
List{Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
114
ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }}} .
eq (gamma ). filterRepayable ( maxRep %, LOR , aFFMList ) =
195 filter (aFFMList ,
(gamma ). isLoanRepayable ( maxRep %, LOR )) .
--- final multiplication by Maxliq or liquidation speed
200 --- factor
op (_). multiplyBy (_) : Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }}
Float0 + ->
205 Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }} .
eq ( ((LED , v), (tau : tau ’)) ). multiplyBy ( maxRep %) =
((LED , (v * maxRep %)), (tau : tau ’)) .
210
--- ----------------------- scenario a ----------------------
--- gets the liquidatable amount of tokens , the liquidated
--- is given by min( liquidatable , all - minted ), where
215 --- all - minted is the total amount of tokens of a
--- specific type minted by the LED.
--- This applies only to scenario (a): C(LED) > Rliq
var maxRep % : Float0 + .
var lp : BC{LP} .
220 var pi : Pi .
op (_). liquidatable (_,_) : Configuration Agent -Id
Minted -Token -> Float0 + .
eq (gamma ). liquidatable (LED , tau ’) =
225 (gamma ). collateralRise (LED) /
(( gamma ).lp).V^m(tau ’) .
op (_). collateralRise (_) : Configuration Agent -Id
-> Float0 + .
230 eq (gamma ). collateralRise (LED) =
(gamma ).V^m(LED) -
(gamma ). collateralThreshold (LED) .
op (_). collateralThreshold (_) : Configuration Agent -Id
235 -> Float0 + .
eq (gamma ). collateralThreshold (LED) =
( ( (gamma ).V^m(LED) -
(( gamma ). Rliq * (( gamma ).lp).V^l(LED )) ) /
(( gamma ). CMin - (gamma ). Rliq) ) *
240 (gamma ). CMin .
including COND - TERNARY { Float0 +} .
op (_). updateVIfGTRliq : Configuration ->
Func{Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
115
245 ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }},
Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }}} .
250 ceq (gamma ). updateVIfGTRliq
[(( LED , v), (tau : tau ’))] =
( (LED , ((v > v’) ? v’ : v)), (tau : tau ’) )
if (gamma ).C(LED) >= (gamma ). Rliq /\
v’ := (gamma ). liquidatable (LED , tau ’) .
255 eq (gamma ). updateVIfGTRliq
[(( LED , v), (tau : tau ’))] =
( (LED , v), (tau : tau ’) ) [owise] .
var aFFMList : List{Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
260 ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }}} .
op (_). updateRepaidUpToCMin (_) : Configuration
List{Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
265 ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }}} ->
List{Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }}} .
270 eq (gamma ). updateRepaidUpToCMin ( aFFMList ) =
map (aFFMList , (gamma ). updateVIfGTRliq ) .
--- -------------------- wrap in 4- tuples -------------------
275 --- ( (Agent -Id , value -to - liquidate ),
--- ( loanTokenType : collateralTokenType ) )
including HO -MAP{Pair{Agent -Id , Pair{Token , Float0 +}},
Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
ColPair {Free -Token ,
280 Minted -Token }}}.
var tau : Free -Token .
var tau ’ : Minted -Token .
var v’ : Float0 + .
op (_). combine : Pair{Agent -Id , Token} ->
285 Func{Pair{Agent -Id , Pair{Token , Float0 +}},
Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }}}.
eq ((LED , tau )). combine [(LED , (tau ’, v ’))] =
290 ((LED , v’), (tau : tau ’)) .
eq ((LED , tau )). combine [(LED ’, (tau ’, v ’))] = nil .
var aTFPList : List{Pair{Agent -Id ,
Pair{Token , Float0 +}}} .
295
including HO -MAP{Pair{Agent -Id , Token},
Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
116
ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }}} .
300
op (_). $combine : List{Pair{Agent -Id ,
Pair{Token , Float0 +}}} ->
Func{Pair{Agent -Id , Token},
Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
305 ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }}} .
eq ( aTFPList ). $combine [(LED , tau )] =
map (aTFPList , ((LED , tau )). combine ) .
310 var aTPList : List{Pair{Agent -Id , Token }} .
op combine (_,_) : List{Pair{Agent -Id , Token }}
List{Pair{Agent -Id ,
Pair{Token , Float0 +}}} ->
List{Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
315 ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }}} .
eq combine (aTPList , aTFPList ) =
map (aTPList , ( aTFPList ). $combine ) .
320
--- ---------------- LIQ params selection -------------------
var aSet : Set{Agent -Id} .
op (_). selectLIQParams (_,_,_) : Configuration Agent -Id
Set{Agent -Id} Float0 + ->
325 Pair{Pair{Agent -Id , Float0 +},
ColPair {Free -Token ,
Minted -Token }} .
eq (gamma ). selectLIQParams (LOR , aSet , maxRep %) =
(( gamma ).lp). seized2Repaid (
330
findMax4TV ^m(
(gamma ). filterRepayable ( maxRep %, LOR ,
(gamma ). updateRepaidUpToCMin (
combine (
335 (gamma ). getAFLTPairs ( aSet , LOR ),
(gamma ). getAMWTPairs ( aSet )
) ) )






including LOR - STRATEGY .
including COND - TERNARY { Float0 +} .
including PAIR{
377 ColPair {Free -Token , Minted -Token},
ColPair {Agent -Id , Float0 +}
} .
117
vars LOR LED : Agent -Id .
382
var gamma : Configuration .
var sigma : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
var tau : Free -Token .
387 var tau ’ : Minted -Token .
var b : Bool .
vars v v’ : Float0 + .
392 var LED - candidates : Set{Agent -Id} .
vars vTmp s : Float0 + .
crl [issue - liquidate ] :
[ gamma
397 < LOR : LIQ -Speed(s) | * sigma > ]
--- DEL all previous liquidate actions issued by LOR
--- over LED
=> [ filterMsgOut ( gamma , (LIQ , (LOR , LED )) )
< LOR : LIQ -Speed(s) | * sigma >
402 liquidate (LOR , LED , (v, tau), tau ’)
]
if ([ gamma ]). isRewritten /\ --- this ensures that 2
--- liquidates can ’t be
--- issued
407 LED - candidates :=
( getUndercoll (gamma) \ getCollNegligible (gamma )) /\
((LED , vTmp), (tau : tau ’)) :=
( gamma
< LOR : LIQ -Speed(s) | * sigma >
412 ). selectLIQParams (LOR , LED -candidates , s) /\
((LED , vTmp), (tau : tau ’)) =/= dummyMax4Tuple /\
LOR =/= LED /\ --- agent can ’t liquidate itself
--- WA : allows to liquidate everything in case
--- vTmp * its price is below a threshold , owise
417 --- computation would not converge
v := ((( vTmp * (( gamma ).lp). price[tau ]) < s) ?





Listing A.8: agents.maude - Maude specifications of the heuristic modelling a
rational liquidator
A.7 Integration with Maude LTL model checker
This listing specifies the sorts and operators implementing the integration with the
Maude native LTL model checker, shipped in the library model-checker.maude.
118
...
mod BC -LP -PREDS is
including BC -LP -MODEL -TEST .
including MODEL - CHECKER .
7
var illConfig illConfig ’ : [ Configuration ] .
var gamma gamma0 gamma* : closedConfiguration .
var config config * : Configuration .
var tau : Token .
12 var tSet : Set{Token} .
vars curS v : Float0 + .
var obj : Object .
var msg : Msg .
var bal : Map{Token , Float0 +} .
17 var agState : Agent -State .
op testLemma1 : closedConfiguration -> Bool .
eq testLemma1 (gamma) =
$testLemma1 (( gamma ). config ,
22 (( gamma ). config ). mintedTokens ) .
var mTokenSet : Set{Minted -Token} .
var tau ’ : Minted -Token .
27 --- pre: 1. Set{Minted -Token} is ( config ). mintedTokens
--- 2. minted token tau is tau ’
op $testLemma1 : Configuration Set{ Token} -> Bool .
eq $testLemma1 (config , empty) = true .
eq $testLemma1 (config , tau ’) =
32 ( config ). balSum (tau ’) ==
snd (( config ).pi.m[( config ).u(tau ’)]) .
eq $testLemma1 (config , (mTokenSet , tau ’)) =
if (( config ). balSum (tau ’) ==
snd (( config ).pi.m[( config ).u(tau ’)])) then




42 op (_). balSum (_) : Configuration Token -> Float0 + .
eq ( config ). balSum (tau) = $balSum (config , tau , 0.0) .
op $balSum : [ Configuration ] Token Float0 + ->
Float0 + .
47 eq $balSum (none , tau , curS) = curS .
eq $balSum (( illConfig < A0:Agent -Id : agState | * bal >),
tau , curS) =
$balSum (illConfig , tau , bal[tau] + curS) .
eq $balSum (( illConfig obj), tau , curS) =
52 $balSum (illConfig , tau , curS) .
eq $balSum (( illConfig msg), tau , curS) =
$balSum (illConfig , tau , curS) .
119
vars gamma0S curSpl g0LentERs g0NotLentERs curERs :
57 Map{Token , Float0 +} .
--- NOTE: this is not the ER of all free -tokens , but
--- only of those free - tokens which are being
--- lent.
62 --- FIXME: note that over here Minted -Token should
--- be considered NOT Free -Token , as it currently
--- is.
op lentERs : closedConfiguration ->
Map{Token , Float0 +} .
67 eq lentERs (gamma) = $ERs( (gamma ). config ,
getLentTokens (gamma),
emptyM ) .
op notLentERs : closedConfiguration ->
72 Map{Token , Float0 +} .
eq notLentERs (gamma) = $ERs( (gamma ). config ,
(gamma ). freeTokens \ getLentTokens (gamma),
emptyM ) .
77 op $ERs : Configuration Set{Token}
Map{Token , Float0 +} ->
Map{Token , Float0 +} .
eq $ERs(config , empty , curERs ) = curERs .
eq $ERs(config , tau , curERs ) =
82 insert (tau , ((( config ).lp).pi).ER(tau), curERs ) .
eq $ERs(config , (tSet , tau), curERs ) =
$ERs(config , tSet ,
insert (tau , ((( config ).lp).pi).ER(tau), curERs )) .
87
op supply : closedConfiguration ->
Map{Token , Float0 +} .
eq supply (gamma) = $supply (( gamma ). config ,
(gamma ). freeTokens ,
92 emptyM ) .
op $supply : Configuration Set{Token}
Map{Token , Float0 +} ->
Map{Token , Float0 +} .
97 eq $supply (config , empty , curSpl ) = curSpl .
eq $supply (config , tau , curSpl ) =
insert (tau , ( config ). balSum (tau) +
( config ).pi.f[tau], curSpl ) .
eq $supply (config , (tSet , tau), curSpl ) =
102 $supply (config , tSet , insert (tau ,
( config ). balSum (tau) +
( config ).pi.f[tau], curSpl )) .
107 op filterGZ : Map{Token , Float0 +} -> Set{Token} .
120
eq filterGZ (bal) = $filterGZ (bal , empty) .
op $filterGZ : Map{Token , Float0 +} Set{Token} ->
Set{Token} .
112 eq $filterGZ (emptyM , tSet) = tSet .
eq $filterGZ (( bal ; tau |-> v), tSet) =
if v > 0.0 then
$filterGZ (bal , (tau , tSet ))
else
117 $filterGZ (bal , tSet)
fi .
var aSet : Set{Agent -Id} .
var A0 : Agent -Id .
122 var pi_l : Map{Agent -Id , Map{Token , Float0 +}} .
op getLentTokens : closedConfiguration
-> Set{Token} .
ceq getLentTokens (gamma) = $getLentTokens (
127 pi_l , dom(pi_l), empty)
if pi_l := (( gamma ). config ).pi.l .
--- NOTE: it could be speeded up by passing here the
--- set of all free - tokens and adding a check
--- pre: agents in aSet must be in domain of pi_l
132 op $getLentTokens : Map{Agent -Id , Map{Token , Float0 +}}
Set{Agent -Id} Set{Token}
-> Set{Token} .
eq $getLentTokens (pi_l , empty , tSet) = tSet .
eq $getLentTokens (pi_l , (aSet , A0), tSet) =
137 $getLentTokens (pi_l , (aSet),
( filterGZ (pi_l[A0]), tSet )) .
var eps : Float0 + .
142 subsort closedConfiguration < State .
op lemma1 : -> Prop .
eq gamma |= lemma1 = testLemma1 (gamma) .
147 --- lemma3
op sameSupply : Map{Free -Token , Float0 +} Float0 + ->
Prop .
eq gamma |= sameSupply (gamma0S , eps) =
supply (gamma) ~= gamma0S : eps .
152 endm




B.1 Modelling stock prices
(a) 13/01/2018-14/04/2018 (b) 01/01/2020-01/04/2020
(c) 24/11/2020-23/02/2021





Figure B2: Prices predictions for the collateral assets produced, for each scenario in





Figure B3: Prices predictions for the loan assets produced, for each scenario in
Table 4.1, by GBMs instantiated with the parameters in Table 4.2.
124
125
B.2 Results of the statistical analysis
Figure B4: Number of LP simulations, per CMin-rliq choices, performed to obtain








Figure B5: Per-borrower collateralization in the three prices scenarios, with varying
liquidation rounds and CMin-rliq choices.
129
C Lending pools simulation
C.1 Full running example
search in SEARCH - EXAMPLE :
Gamma^i0 =>* X: closedConfiguration .
Solution 1 (state 0) –- Γi0, in Table 2.3
5 states : 1 rewrites : 147 in 0ms cpu (0ms real)
(~ rewrites / second )
X: closedConfiguration --> [(
{
fund: tau (0) |-> 3.0e+2 ; tau (1) |-> 1.95e+2,
10 loan: A |-> tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
B |-> tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
C |-> tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’ ,3.0e+2) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’ ,5.0e+2)
15 }
|
tau (0) |-> 1.0 ; tau (1) |-> 1.0
)
< A : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
20 tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< B : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
25 < C : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< D : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 5.0e+2 ;
30 tau (1)’ |-> 5.0e+2) >
< C(0) : Coll | * (A ,1.25) ,
* (B ,1.0) ,
* (C ,0.8) ,
* (D,-) >
35 < R(0) : Round | none >
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1000000000000001) >
liquidate (D, A, (5.0e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)
liquidate (D, B, (9.0909090909090907 e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)
liquidate (D, C, (9.0909090909090907 e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)]
40
Solution 2 (state 1) –- Γ1,1, in Table 2.3
states : 2 rewrites : 1247 in 0ms cpu (1ms real)
(~ rewrites / second )
X: closedConfiguration --> [(
45 {
fund: tau (0) |-> 3.0e+2 ; tau (1) |-> 2.45e+2,
loan: A |-> tau (1) |-> 3.0e+1 ;
B |-> tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
130
C |-> tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2,
50 mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’ ,3.0e+2) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’ ,5.0e+2)
}
|
tau (0) |-> 1.0 ; tau (1) |-> 1.0
55 )
< A : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 4.4999999999999993 e+1) >
< B : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
60 tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< C : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
65 < D : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 4.5e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 5.5000000000000007 e+1 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 5.0e+2) >
< C(1) : Coll | * (A ,1.5) ,
70 * (B ,1.0) ,
* (C ,0.8) ,
* (D,-) >
< R(1) : Round | none >
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1000000000000001) >
75 liquidate (D, B, (9.0909090909090907 e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)
liquidate (D, C, (9.0909090909090907 e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)]
Solution 3 (state 2) –- Γ1,2, in Table 2.3
states : 3 rewrites : 2335 in 0ms cpu (1ms real)
80 (~ rewrites / second )
X: closedConfiguration --> [(
{
fund: tau (0) |-> 3.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 2.8590909090909088 e+2,
85 loan: A |-> tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
B |-> tau (1) |-> 9.0909090909090935 ;
C |-> tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’ ,3.0e+2) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’ ,5.0e+2)
90 }
|
tau (0) |-> 1.0 ; tau (1) |-> 1.0
)
< A : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
95 tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< B : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 0.0) >
100 < C : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2 ;
131
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< D : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 4.0909090909090912 e+2 ;
105 tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 5.0e+2) >
< C(1) : Coll | * (A ,1.25) ,
* (B ,0.0) ,
* (C ,0.8) ,
110 * (D,-) >
< R(1) : Round | none >
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1000000000000001) >
liquidate (D, A, (5.0e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)
liquidate (D, C, (9.0909090909090907 e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)]
115
Solution 4 (state 3) –- Γ1,3, in Table 2.3
states : 4 rewrites : 3423 in 0ms cpu (2ms real)
(~ rewrites / second )
X: closedConfiguration --> [(
120 {
fund: tau (0) |-> 3.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 2.8590909090909088 e+2,
loan: A |-> tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
B |-> tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
125 C |-> tau (1) |-> 3.4090909090909093 e+1,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’ ,3.0e+2) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’ ,5.0e+2)
}
|
130 tau (0) |-> 1.0 ; tau (1) |-> 1.0
)
< A : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
135 < B : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< C : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2 ;
140 tau (0)’ |-> 0.0) >
< D : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 4.0909090909090912 e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 5.0e+2) >
145 < C(1) : Coll | * (A ,1.25) ,
* (B ,1.0) ,
* (C ,0.0) ,
* (D,-) >
< R(1) : Round | none >
150 < P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1000000000000001) >
liquidate (D, A, (5.0e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)
liquidate (D, B, (9.0909090909090907 e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)]
Solution 5 (state 4) –- Γ2,1, in Table 2.3
132
155 states : 5 rewrites : 4575 in 3ms cpu (3ms real)
(1374699 rewrites / second )
X: closedConfiguration --> [(
{
fund: tau (0) |-> 3.0e+2 ;
160 tau (1) |-> 3.3590909090909088 e+2,
loan: A |-> tau (1) |-> 3.0e+1 ;
B |-> tau (1) |-> 9.0909090909090935 ;
C |-> tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’ ,3.0e+2) ;
165 tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’ ,5.0e+2)
}
|
tau (0) |-> 1.0 ; tau (1) |-> 1.0
)
170 < A : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 4.4999999999999993 e+1) >
< B : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
175 tau (0)’ |-> 0.0) >
< C : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< D : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
180 tau (1) |-> 3.5909090909090912 e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.55e+2 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 5.0e+2) >
< C(2) : Coll | * (A ,1.4999999999999998) ,
* (B ,0.0) ,
185 * (C ,8.0000000000000004e-1),
* (D,-) >
< R(2) : Round | none >
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1000000000000001) >
liquidate (D, C, (9.0909090909090907 e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)]
190
Solution 6 (state 5) –- Γ2,2, in Table 2.3
states : 6 rewrites : 5727 in 3ms cpu (4ms real)
(1720853 rewrites / second )
X: closedConfiguration --> [(
195 {
fund: tau (0) |-> 3.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 3.3590909090909088 e+2,
loan: A |-> tau (1) |-> 3.0e+1 ;
B |-> tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
200 C |-> tau (1) |-> 3.4090909090909093 e+1,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’ ,3.0e+2) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’ ,5.0e+2)
}
|
205 tau (0) |-> 1.0 ; tau (1) |-> 1.0
)
< A : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
133
tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 4.4999999999999993 e+1) >
210 < B : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< C : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2 ;
215 tau (0)’ |-> 0.0) >
< D : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 3.5909090909090912 e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.55e+2 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 5.0e+2) >
220 < C(2) : Coll | * (A ,1.4999999999999998) ,
* (B ,1.0) ,
* (C ,0.0) ,
* (D,-) >
< R(2) : Round | none >
225 < P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1000000000000001) >
liquidate (D, B, (9.0909090909090907 e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)]
Solution 7 (state 6) –- Γ2,3, in Table 2.3
states : 7 rewrites : 7436 in 6ms cpu (7ms real)
230 (1120385 rewrites / second )
X: closedConfiguration --> [(
{
fund: tau (0) |-> 3.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 3.7681818181818176 e+2,
235 loan: A |-> tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
B |-> tau (1) |-> 9.0909090909090935 ;
C |-> tau (1) |-> 3.4090909090909093 e+1,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’ ,3.0e+2) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’ ,5.0e+2)
240 }
|
tau (0) |-> 1.0 ; tau (1) |-> 1.0
)
< A : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
245 tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 1.0e+2) >
< B : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 0.0) >
250 < C : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 0.0) >
< D : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 3.1818181818181824 e+2 ;
255 tau (0)’ |-> 2.0e+2 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 5.0e+2) >
< C(2) : Coll | * (A ,1.25) ,
* (B ,0.0) ,
* (C ,0.0) ,
260 * (D,-) >
134
< R(2) : Round | none >
< P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1000000000000001) >
liquidate (D, A, (5.0e+1, tau (1)) , tau (0) ’)]
265 Solution 8 (state 7) –- Γ3,1, in Table 2.3
states : 8 rewrites : 9701 in 9ms cpu (10 ms real)
(974093 rewrites / second )
X: closedConfiguration --> [(
{
270 fund: tau (0) |-> 3.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 4.2681818181818176 e+2,
loan: A |-> tau (1) |-> 3.0e+1 ;
B |-> tau (1) |-> 9.0909090909090935 ;
C |-> tau (1) |->
275 3.4090909090909093 e+1,
mint: tau (0) |-> (tau (0) ’ ,3.0e+2) ;
tau (1) |-> (tau (1) ’ ,5.0e+2)
}
|
280 tau (0) |-> 1.0 ; tau (1) |-> 1.0
)
< A : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 8.0e+1 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 4.4999999999999993 e+1) >
285 < B : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 0.0) >
< C : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 0.0 ;
tau (1) |-> 1.25e+2 ;
290 tau (0)’ |-> 0.0) >
< D : noState | * (tau (0) |-> 1.0e+2 ;
tau (1) |-> 2.6818181818181824 e+2 ;
tau (0)’ |-> 2.55e+2 ;
tau (1)’ |-> 5.0e+2) >
295 < C(3) : Coll | * (A ,1.5) ,
* (B ,0.0) ,
* (C ,0.0) ,
* (D,-) >
< R(3) : Round | none >
300 < P(0) : LiqParams | CMin (1.5) , Rliq (1.1) >]
No more solutions .
states : 8 rewrites : 10827 in 9ms cpu (11 ms real)
(1087157 rewrites / second )
Listing C.1: search.maude - Full running example representing the configurations
in Table 2.3
